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This Article addresses physician-assisted suicide and the medical treatment of pain and suffering. Part II
discusses various medical misconceptions about the treatment of pain and how modern medicine fails to
fulfill this aspect of its palliative care role. Part III reviews how the law currently circumscribes the patient and
doctor's ability to make medical decisions when the patient is terminally ill. As will be shown, the law is
clearer and more respectful of good medical practice than most medical practitioners currently believe.
Moreover, this section will also establish that, while several competing philosophical positions surrounding
physician-assisted suicide exist, these same philosophies harmoniously approve of aggressive pain treatment.
Part IV examines the role of the criminal law in medical treatment decisions, particularly those made at the
end of life, regarding palliative care to relieve pain and suffering. It will in no way exhaust the subject of end-oflife medical treatment, nor will it discuss every possible place at which the practice of medicine and the
criminal law might cross paths. Rather, Part IV considers some of the most important points of intersection
between the two, and attempts to clarify the most significant principles of law and ethics that apply when the
criminal law seeks to scrutinize medical decisions about palliative care to dying persons. It then should be
apparent that the rush to legalize assisted suicide is misdirected and diversionary.
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If the changes we fear be thus irresistible,

what remains but to acquiesce with silence, as in the other insurmountable distresses of
humanity? It remains that we retard what we cannot repel, that
we palliate what we cannot cure.
-

Samuel Johnson
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I. INTRODUCTION

The subject of physician-assisted suicide has inundated America's culture over the course of the last decade. For the last seven
years, Dr. Jack Kevorkian, the notorious pathologist from Michigan, has defied the American legal system to find him guilty of a
crime. 2 With his assistance, at least forty-five people have ended
3
their lives. Nonetheless, three juries have acquitted him of statu4
tory and common-law versions of the crime of assisting suicide.
While Michigan authorities have apparently surrendered in their
attempt to circumscribe his death-inducing activities,; Dr. Kevorkian continues to make regular public appearances in which he
describes exactly what he has done and why he believes his acts are
justifiable. 6 Moreover, he continues to declare adamantly that he
7
will continue helping virtual strangers end their lives.
While Dr. Kevorkian persists in his practices, the public clamor
for the legalization of physician-assisted suicide has intensified.
Surveys reveal that up to two-thirds of Americans support some
8
form of medical assistance to hasten the death of the terminally ill.
2. See Prosecutor Drops Charges Against Kevorkian, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1997, at
News 11 (reporting that the prosecutor dropped the charges against Dr. Kevorkian in ten assisted suicides because "it would be a waste of time and taxpayer
money to pursue him").
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See Charges Dropped Against Kevorkian: New Prosecutor Says Cases Couldn't Be
Won, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1997, at News 1 (indicating that the prosecutor believed
the charges could not be successfully prosecuted and that the likely effect could
actually be counterproductive by enhancing Dr. Kevorkian's crusade).
6. See, e.g., Brian Harmon, The Many Faces ofJack Kevorkian, DET. NEWS, Feb.
23, 1997, at Al (detailing a conversation with Dr. Kevorkian in which he relates
his views on physician-assisted suicide).
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., Jerald G. Bachman et al., Attitudes of Michigan Physicians and the
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In addition, some studies reveal that more than half of the nation's
doctors support physician-assisted suicide,9 despite the fact that
numerous professional organizations do not condone the prac10
tice. The appearance of electoral proposals further evidences the
strength of current public opinion. While previous measures in
two states narrowly failed,11 in 1994, Oregon voters passed the
Public Toward Legalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia, 334 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 303, 306-07 (1996) (sUIveying and comparing the attitudes of Michigan physicians and the general adult population toward legalizing physicianassisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia); Robert J. Blendon et aI., Should Physicians Aid Their Patients in Dying? The Public Perspective, 267 JAMA 2658, 2659 (1992)
(examining the public's interest in and support of physician-assisted suicide,
euthanasia, and right-to-die legislation by reviewing surveys conducted between
1950 and 1991).
However, a recent poll produced more complicated results. Forty percent
of the respondents did not know that it was legal to give patients pain medication
that might hasten death, and 35% were unfamiliar with the terms "hospice" and
"palliative care." Mter these terms were explained, 73% said they would choose
hospice care, palliative care, or natural death if terminally ill, 14% were undecided, and only 13% said they would still choose physician-assisted suicide. See
AMA Poll: The More Patients Know, the Less They Want Suicide Aid, AM. MED. NEWS,
Jan. 13, 1997, at 3.
9. See Melinda A. Lee et aI., Legalizing Assisted Suicide - Views of Physicians in
Oregon, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 310, 310 (1996) (noting that studies show that between 31 % and 54% of United States physicians do not oppose legalizing physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia).
10. See, e.g., Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Decisions Near the End of Life, 267 JAMA 2229, 2233 (1992) (concluding
that physicians should not assist patients with suicide until the issue has been
more thoroughly examined); Nessa Coyle, The Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted
Suicide Debate: Issues for Nursing, 19 ONCOLOGY NURSING F. 41, 44 (1992) (stating
that the American Nurses Association takes the position that it is against the ethical tradition of nursing to help patients end their lives).
The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs states that although "in highly
sympathetic cases physician-assisted suicide may seem to constitute beneficent
care, due to the potential for grave harm the medical profession cannot condone
physician-assisted suicide at this time." Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
supra, at 2233. Instead, the Council directs the medical profession to strive to
identify the concerns behind patients' requests for assisted suicide and to find
ways other than assisted suicide to address these concerns, such as providing more
aggressive comfort care. See id.
The American Medical Association reaffirmed its position when it formed a
coalition to ask the U.S. Supreme Court not to legalize the practice when ruling
upon the physician-assisted suicide cases argued recently before it. See AMA Poll:
The More Patients Know, supra note 8, at 3.
11. See Death with Dignity Act, 1992 Cal. Legis. Servo Prop. 161 (West) (rejected by the voters Nov. 3, 1992); Death with Dignity Act, 1991 Wash. Legis. Servo
Init. Meas. 119 (West) (rejected by the people Nov. 5, 1991); see also Bachman et
aI., supra note 8, at 303 (noting the defects of the Washington and California initiatives and discussing the Oregon initiative); William Carlsen, When Patients
Choose to Die, S.F. CHRON., June 3, 1996, at Al (noting that the California proposi-
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Death with Dignity Act,12 the nation's first statute permitting doctors to prescribe lethal medications to allow terminally ill patients
to kill themselves. IS Other states have considered legislation legalizing physician-assisted suicide, but, as yet, no statutes have been
14
passe.
d
More recently, the push for the legalization of physicianassisted suicide entered the courthouse. In January 1997, the
United States Supreme Court heard arguments regarding the conl5
l6
stitutionality of statutes from New York and Washington that
prohibit anyone from assisting another in committing suicide. 17
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that New York's bar
against physician-assisted suicide is an unconstitutional infringement of the Equal Protection Clause. 18 The Ninth Circuit took a
tion was defeated 52% to 48% while Washington voters rejected that measure
53.5% to 46.5%); cf. Annette E. Clark, Autonomy and Death, 71 TuL. L. REv. 45, 56
(1996) (stating that both initiatives were defeated by identical 54% to 46% margins).
12. See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897 (1996) (passed by voters in a general
election on Nov. 8,1994). Oregon voters approved the measure by the narrowest
of margins, 51 % to 49%. See Clark, supra note 11, at 58 n.40.
At the time of this writing, several bills are before the Oregon legislature to
amend or repeal the statute. One bill proposes the addition of provisions that
provide physicians with immunity from civil and criminal liability and professional
discipline for good-faith compliance with Oregon's Death with Dignity Act. See
H.B. 3362, 69th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Or.). Another bill expands the scope of
the required counseling for patients who request physician-assisted suicide. See
H.B. 2965, 69th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Or.). A third repeals the Death with Dignity Act. See H.B. 2700, 69th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Dr.).
13. See OR. REv. STAT. § 127.885 (1995); see also Lee v. Oregon, Nos. 9535804, 95-35948, 95-35805, 95-35949, 95-35854, 1997 WL 80783, at *1 (9th Cir.
Feb. 27, 1997) (dismissing a lawsuit challenging Oregon's Death with Dignity
Act).
14. In 1992 alone, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, and New Hampshire introduced
bills legalizing physician-assisted suicide. In 1994, New York introduced legislation that would legalize physician-assisted suicide for mentally competent, terminally ill adults. However, in 1996, an overwhelming majority of the New Hampshire House rejected that bill. See Clark, supra note 11, at 55-56 nn.27-28.
15. See N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 120.30, 125.15(3) (McKinney 1987) (declaring a
person guilty of a felony for promoting a suicide attempt; declaring a person
guilty of manslaughter in the second degree for intentionally causing or aiding
another person to commit suicide).
16. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988) (designating it a felony to promote a suicide attempt by knowingly causing or aiding another person
to attempt suicide).
17. See Justices Question Argument for Suicide: Court Begins Review of Assisted
Death Issue, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8,1997, at News 1 [hereinafter Court Begins Review of
Assisted Death Issue].
18. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d Cir.), cm. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36
(1996).
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19

different route to reach the same result.
It concluded that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment renders Washington's statute unconstitutional, because it impermissibly prohibits doctors from prescribing potentially lethal medications to competent, terminally ill patients who wish to end their lives. 20 A
decision from the high court is expected during the summer of
21
1997.
Underlying much of the discussion about physician-assisted
suicide is the public's fear of undergoing a prolonged and painful
22
demise.
Advocates of physician-assisted death have focused on
this fear, rather than dealing with the most critical component of
this issue: the ability of medicine to treat pain. The current debate
has incorrectly centered on the perception of a painful death
rather than how medical practitioners carry out their role of alleviating pain. Yet it is clear that fears about inadequate pain control,
which drive the physician-assisted suicide debate, are at the heart of
the issue. Patients whose pain is adequately controlled rarely want
assisted suicide. In a recent study, seventy-three percent of persons, when they understood what "palliative care" and "hospice"
meant, said they would choose those options over physician-assisted
23
suicide. By refocusing attention on how medicine addresses the
problem, rather than the problem itself, the public's motivation for
favoring physician-assisted suicide seemingly dissipates.
Shifting attention to how medicine addresses pain, though, reveals an entirely separate set of difficulties. As many have observed,
no physician in the United States has ever been convicted of murder or assisted suicide for providing a patient with high doses of
4
medication for pain relieC Despite this, a recent study revealed
19. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.) , stay
granted by Washington v. Glucksberg, 116 S. Ct. 2494, cen. granted, 117 S. Ct. 37
(1996).
20. See id. at 838.
21. See Courl Begins Review of Assisted Death Issue, supra note 17, at News 1.
22. See Melissa L. Buchan, M.D., & Susan W. Tolle, M.D., Pain Relieffor Dying
Persons: Dealing with Physicians' Fears and Concerns, 6 J. CUNICAL ETHICS 53, 53
(1995) (stating that in developed countries 50% to 80% of patients do not receive
adequate pain relief); Sidney H. Wanzer, M.D., et aI., The Physician's Responsibility
Toward Hopelessly III Patients: A Second Look, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 844, 847 (1989)
[hereinafter Wanzer, A Second Look] (summarizing current practices affecting the
care of dying patients).
23. See AMA Poll: The More Patients Know, supra note 8, at 3.
24. See, e.g., Buchan & Tolle, supra note 22, at 57 ("To our knowledge, no
physician in the United States has ever been convicted of murder or assisted suicide for providing a patient with appropriate high-dose pain medication."); Leon-
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that physicians consistently fail to treat pain adequately.25 The
study, involving 687 physicians and 759 nurses in five hospitals,
asked the health care providers to assess the care that dying patients received at the end of their lives. 26 Overall, eighty-one percent of the participants reported that "the most common form of
'narcotic abuse' in the care of the dying is undertreatment of
pain.,,27 Just over one-third of the physicians and forty-four percent
of the nurses expressed the view that under-medication is most often due to the "fear of hastening a patient's death" or, in other
28
words, of providing a last, lethal dose. Thus, the fact that modern
medicine fails adequately to address patient pain certainly lends
credence to the public's fear of a horrible end.
Minnesota's experiences further detail this disturbing trend.
Two investigations of several physicians and their palliative care of
two dying patients occurred in Hennepin County, Minnesota, in
1989. 29 While these cases never proceeded beyond the investigation stage,30 they caused considerable distress in the local medical
community.31 More importantly, they reveal the fears physicians
face when they attempt to provide appropriate pain relief to dying
.
32
patIents.
This Article addresses some of the issues that these cases raise.
Part II discusses various medical misconceptions about the treatard H. Glantz, Withholding and Withdrawing Treatment: The Role of the Criminal Law,
15 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 231,238-40 (1987); Sidney H. Wanzer, M.D., et aI.,
The Physician's Responsibility to Hopelessly III Patients, 310 NEW ENG.]. MED. 955, 956
(1984) [hereinafter Wanzer, Physician's Responsibility] (noting that criminal
charges against physicians who withdraw life support are rare); Thomas L. Johnson, "Good Death" Can Have a Bad Ending, HENNEPIN LAw., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 11
("[N]o physician ha[s] ever been successfully prosecuted anywhere in the United
States for an act of either omission or commission that led to the death of a seriously ill patient.").
25. See Mildred Z. Solomon et aI., Decisions Near the End of Life: Professional
Views on Life Sustaining Treatments, 83 AM.]. PUB. HEALTH 14, 19 (1993).
26. See id. at 15.

27. Id.
28. !d.
29. See Gordon Slovut, County Attorney Calls Deaths Homicide, But He Won't
Prosecute, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 25, 1990, at lB.
30. SeeJohnson, supra note 24, at 10.
31. See Michele Cook & Walter Parker, Second Morphine Death Probed: St. Paul
Man's Death in Hospital Ruled Homicide, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Aug. 30,
1989, at lA (quoting Dr. Ronald Cranford, a neurologist and medical ethicist at
Hennepin County Medical Center, as saying "the potential for criminal indictments would have an extremely deleterious effect. It would discourage what we
are trying to encourage").
32. See id.
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ment of pain and how modern medicine fails to fulfill this aspect of
its palliative care role. Part III reviews how the law currently circumscribes the patient and doctor's ability to make medical decisions when the patient is terminally ill. As will be shown, the law is
clearer and more respectful of good medical practice than most
medical practitioners currently believe. Moreover, this section will
also establish that, while several competing philosophical positions
surrounding physician-assisted suicide exist, these same philosophies harmoniously approve of aggressive pain treatment.
Part IV examines the role of the criminal law in medical
treatment decisions, particularly those made at the end of life, regarding palliative care to relieve pain and suffering. It will in no
way exhaust the subject of end-of-life medical treatment, nor will it
discuss every possible place at which the practice of medicine and
the criminal law might cross paths. Rather, Part IV considers some
of the most important points of intersection between the two, and
attempts to clarifY the most significant principles of law and ethics
that apply when the criminal law seeks to scrutinize medical decisions about palliative care to dying persons. It then should be apparent that the rush to legalize assisted suicide is misdirected and
diversionary.
II. MEDICAL MISCONCEPTIONS AND THE FAILURE OF MODERN
MEDICINE TO TREAT PAIN

For many, the prospect of legal access to a physician's help in
bringing about a swift end to a long and painful dying process is a
welcome blessing. The thought of dependence, indignity and,
worst of all, unremitting suffering at the end of life is an unimagin33
able horror. For some doctors, the most difficult aspect of caring
for such patients is the knowledge that at some point they may have
to say no to a patient's plea for a swift and easy death,:l4 or risk professional sanctions and perhaps criminal prosecution for acceding

33. See George C. Garbesi, The Law of Assisted Suicide, 3 ISSUES L. & MED. 93,
104 (1989) (noting that the pain and suffering associated with terminal illness
leaves some "unable to derive even minimal pleasure from their existence").
34. See Wanzer, Physician's Responsibility, supra note 24, at 956 (noting that a
"physician's schooling, residency training, and professional oath emphasize positive actions to sustain and prolong life"); Julia Pugliese, Note, Don't Ask - Don't
Tell: The Secret Practice of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 44 HAsTINGS LJ. 1291, 1300, 1306
(1993) (stating that doctors face a difficult quandary: assisting suicide is illegal, yet
refusing to assist is contrary to medical ethics).
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S5

to the desperate request. Many physicians, in addition to wanting
to avoid this issue, find the public's growing demand for physician
aid in dying as posing the gravest of risks to the integrity of the
medical profession and to the relationship between the doctor and
S6
the dying patient.
A.

Inadequate Access to Palliative Care and Lack of Proper Physician
Training

Palliative care refers to the care of terminally ill patients near
s7
the end of their lives. The primary goal of this type of care is to
alleviate pain, rather than to prolong life.!l8 During the latter part
of this century, palliative medicine finally has been endorsed as a
critical part of any rational health care policy. 39 An outgrowth of
this evolution in medicine has been the advent of hospice care,
40
which has flourished in the United States. Hospice care has steadily become a favored way of treating the terminally ill since such facilities specialize in all aspects of palliative care,41 with the goal of

35. See Buchan & Tolle, supra note 22, at 53-54; Pugliese, supra note 34, at
1291-92 (narrating the story of one doctor who assisted a terminally ill patient in
ending his life and later lied about and covered up his actions to avoid possible
negative repercussions).
36. See Pugliese, supra note 34, at 1315-16 (stating that some doctors fear
their role will be seen, at least in the eyes of some potential patients, as that of a
killer rather than a healer).
37. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1284 (26th ed. 1995) (defining "palliative") .
38. See id. "Palliative therapy is treatment undertaken with the objective of
relieving symptoms, particularly when these are painful, or in some other way distressing, but in the knowledge that it will not affect the outcome of the disease."
THE OXFORD MEDICAL COMPANION 722 Uohn Walton et al. eds., 1994).
39. See Christine K Cassel, M.D., & Bruce C. Vladeck, M.D., ICD-9 Code fM
Palliative M Terminal Care, 335 NEW ENG.]. MED. 1232, 1232 (1996).
40. See id.; Wanzer, A Second Look, supra note 22, at 845; Walter Parker, Medicine, Law Clash over Mmphine, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Oct. 2, 1989, at

1A.
41. Webster's defines hospice as "a home like facility to provide supportive
care for terminally ill patients." WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 879 (2d ed.
1983). Hospice care in this country follows the principles of its English originator, Dame Cicely Saunders, founder of London's St. Christopher's Hospice. See
Ronald Melzack, T~ Tragedy of Needless Pain, SCI. AM., Feb. 1990, at 27, 28. The
richness of hospice care, as Dr. Saunders envisioned and practiced it, cannot be
adequately described here. The control of physical pain, our concern here, is but
one part of this extraordinary form of treatment. For a detailed description of
how the hospice program works and how patients have become part of the
movement to help others, see generally SANDOL STODDARD, THE HOSPICE
MOVEMENT: A BETfER WAY OF CARING FOR THE DYING (1978).
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preserving and enhancing the quality of life for those who are near
45
42
its end. Excellent pain relief is its hallmark. Still, hospices in the
United States presently serve only a disappointing seventeen per44
cent of all dying patients.
The primary reason for this is that
home care is an integral, often required, component of most hos45
pice plans. As a result, hospice care usually is inaccessible to those
patients without family members who can provide twenty-four-hour
support. 46 Since nearly eighty percent of Americans die in either
hospitals or nursing homes,47 the vast majority of dying patients are
48
subject to the most uneven quality in palliative care.
Palliative care has struggled to take root in the United States
for reasons other than lack of access to hospice care. The failure of
medical schools properly to train students how to manage pain effectively exacerbates the problem. Most medical students are offered only a short elective course in palliative care in their last year
49
of school, and few choose it. Residents in a majority of hospitals
receive little training and experience in how to care for the terminally ill.50 Moreover, studies reveal that health care professionals'
See Melzack, supra note 41, at 28.
See id.
44. See Cassel & Vladeck, supra note 39, at 1232.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. (noting that 17% of Americans die in nursing homes and 61 % die
in hospitals).
48. See id. at 1232-33. The care of dying patients in America varies greatly
among hospitals. According to one study,
half the physicians did not respect or know about patients' advance directives, the majority of do-not-resuscitate orders were not instituted until 24 hours before the patients' death, and most soberingly, 40[%] of
patients had severe and potentially treatable pain for more than several
days before they died.
Id. (citing The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care
for Seriously Ia Hospitalized Patients, 274JAMA 1591 (1995».
49. See id. at 1232. The American Medical Association's report on medical
education states that only five of 126 medical schools in the country require a
separate course in care of the dying. See T. Patrick Hill, Treating the Dying Patient:
The Challenge for Medical Education, 155 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1265, 1265
(1995).
50. See Hill, supra note 49, at 1265. Of 7048 residency programs, only 26%
offer a course on the medical and legal aspects of care at the end of life as a regular part of the curriculum. See id; see also Kathleen M. Foley, M.D., Competent Care
for the Dying Instead of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 54, 55-56
(1997) [hereinafter Foley, Competent Care] ("According to a survey of 1068 accredited residency programs in family medicine, internal medicine, and pediatrics and
fellowship programs in geriatrics, each resident or fellow coordinates the care of
10 or fewer dying patients annually.").
42.

43.
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knowledge of the science of pharmacology and the management of
pain control is sorely deficient in the United States. 51 This remains
true despite the fact that in recent years, proponents of palliative
medicine have developed helpful guidelines for the aggressive
management of intractable symptoms in dying patients. 52 Not only
do these guidelines recommend dosages of opioids and other
drugs to manage pain, they also approve sedation for patients
whose pain cannot be controlled effectively. 53
Many explanations have been offered for our fixation on physician-assisted suicide as the only solution to the problem of suffering at the end of life. All of them, however, seem to involve a recognition that humane, compassionate, and effective care for the
dying, especially good pain relief, is provided only irregularly in
this country.54 This remains true despite the fact that numerous
professional organizations have stressed the critical importance of

51. See Buchan & Tolle, supra note 22, at 57; I. G. Finlay, House Officers' Attitudes Towards Terminal Care, 20 MED. EDUC. 507, 508-09 (1986); Foley, Competent
Care, supra note 50, at 55-56; Lynette Smeder Fox, Pain Management in the Terminally III Cancer Patient: An Investigation of Nurses' Attitudes, Knowledge and Clinical
Practice, 147 MIL. MED. 455, 456 (1982); Solomon et aI., supra note 25, at 20-21;
Jamie H. Von Roenn, M.D., et aI., Physician Attitudes and Practice in Cancer Pain
Management: A Survey from the Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group, 119 ANNALS
INTERNALMED. 121, 125-26 (1993).
52. See, e.g., Nathan I. Cherny et aI., Guidelines in the Care of the Dying Patient,
10 HEMATOLOGY/ONCOLOGY CLINICS N. AM. 261, 263, 265-67 (1996) [hereinafter
Cherny, Guidelines in the Care of the Dying Patient] (describing the features essential
to the care of dying patients as clinical competence, compassion, comfort, communication, visits from children, family cohesion and integration, cheerfulness,
consistency and perseverance, and equanimity); Nathan I. Cherny & Rusell K.
Portenoy, Sedation in the Management of Refractory Symptoms: Guidelines for Evaluation
and Treatment, 10 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 31, 32-33 (1994); Robert D. Truog, M.D., et
aI., Barbiturates in the Care of the Terminally Il~ 327 NEW ENG. J. MED .. 1678, 1681
(1992) (describing the potential utility of barbiturates for terminal anguish).
53. See Cherny, Guidelines in the Care of the Dying Patient, supra note 52, at 265
(stating that adequate relief of physical and psychological pain in terminally ill
patients can be accomplished through comprehensive care); Cherny & Portenoy,
supra note 52, at 35 (recommending alternatives to opioids to sedate patients with
refractory pain); Truog, supra note 52, at 1681.
54. See Jo Ann Dalton, Nurses' Perceptions of Their Pain Assessment Skills, Pain
Management Practices, and Attitudes Toward Pain, 16 ONCOLOGY NURSING F. 225, 22526 (1989); Karin L. Dorrepaal et aI., Pain Experience and Pain Management Among
Hospitalized Cancer Patients, 63 CANCER 593, 594 (1989); Kathleen M. Foley, The
Treatment of Cancer Pain, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 84, 87 (1985) [hereinafter Foley,
Treatment of Cancer Pain]; William T. McGiveney & Glenna M. Crooks, The Care of
Patients with Severe Chronic Pain in Terminal Illness, 251 JAMA 1182, 1182 (1984);
Solomon et aI., supra note 25, at 20; Wanzer, Physician's Responsibility, supra note
24, at 956; Melzack, supra note 41, at 27.
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good pain control for dying patients, even when the drugs given
55
may incidentally shorten life.
B.

Medical Misconceptions Regarding the Use of Drugs to Treat the
Terminally III

In addition to the inadequate access to hospice care and training of medical practitioners, other hurdles prevent patients from
receiving aggressive pain treatment. A common obstacle to zealous
pain relief for dying patients has been the collective misunderstanding by patients and physicians of the process by which patients
56
may develop tolerance to morphine and other opioids. Physicians
and patients alike often have unfounded concerns about addiction,
and they erroneously equate the normal development of tolerance
57
to opioids with addiction. As research shows, these fears are unsubstantiated.
Numerous studies have shown addiction to be extremely rare
in patients who had not previously shown such tendencies. 58 Clinical observation of patterns of opioid use instead have revealed that
many patients maintain stable doses of opioids for long periods of
time without requiring a dose escalation or reduction. 59 While the
majority of patients may be managed within a fairly standard range
of dosage,60 some patients require and tolerate increasingly high

55. See, e.g., AMERICAN NURSING AssOCIATION, PosmON STATEMENT ON
PROMOTION OF COMFORT AND RELIEF OF PAIN IN DYING PATIENTS 1 (1995) (promoting the belief of the American Nurses Association that nurses are obligated to use
aggressive efforts to relieve pain and other symptoms of dying patients); American
College of Physicians, American College of Physicians Ethics Manual Third Edition, 117
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 947, 955 (1992) (stressing that physicians should make
the relief of pain in dying patients their number one objective, "even if a side effect is to shorten life").
56. See C. Brian Tuttle, Drug Management of Pain in Cancer Patients, 132 CAN.
MED. Assoc.]. 121, 132 (1985). Morphine is a central nervous system depressant
derived from opium poppies. See PDR GENERICS 1974-75 (1st ed. 1995). It is frequently prescribed for "the relief of severe acute and severe chronic pain." [d. at
1976. When used incorrectly, morphine can lead to serious side effects, such as
respiratory depression, systemic failure of the nervous system, coma, and death.
See id. at 1980.
57. See Tuttle, supra note 56, at 132.
58. See Kathleen M. Foley, M.D., The Relationship of Pain and Symptom Management to Patient Requests for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 6 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT.
289,291 (1991); Tuttle, supra note 56, at 132; Kathleen M. Foley, M.D., Controlling
the Pain of Cancer, SCI. AM., Sept. 1996, at 165 [hereinafter Foley, Controlling Pain].
59. See Tuttle, supra note 56, at 132.
60. See id.
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doses of morphine and other opioids,61 but they still can obtain
62
good pain relief without undesirable side effects. It is critical to
understand that tolerance has no upper limit. 63 In patients who
develop tolerance to these drugs, the medication must be withdrawn slowly, as the need for pain relief diminishes, to prevent
64
withdrawal symptoms.
This physiological tolerance, however, is
not "addfction. ,,65 True addiction is the psychological condition
"characterized by constant craving and compulsive drug-seeking
behavior,,,66an d it rarely occurs in these situations. 67
Respiratory depression appears to be another greatly over66
stated risk of morphine use in dying patients. Considerable evidence indicates that pain and other discomfort serves to counteract
any depressive effects of the drug. 69 Risk obviously is involved in
suddenly and sharply elevating any patient's morphine dosage, just
70
as it is risky to give large doses to an "opiate naive" patient. Hospice care has demonstrated, however, that if administration of the
drug is begun earlier in the course of the patient's disease, in doses
just large enough to control pain, the patient's quality of life may
be greatly improved, even as the patient's morphine requirements
71
increase with the progression of disease.
Authorities on palliative care for the terminally ill have identified additional explanations for why physicians fail competently to

61. See id.
62. See id. See generally Shirley L. Lo & Robert R. Coleman, Exceptionally High
Narcotic Analgesic Requirements in a Terminally III Cancer Patient, 5 CUNICAL
PHARMACY 828 (1986) (describing a terminally ill patient who required high doses
of narcotics to control pain and overcome tolerance).
63. See Kathleen M. Foley, M.D., Misconceptions and Controversies Regarding the
Use of Opioids in Cancer Pain, 6 ANn-CANCER DRUGS 308, 314 (1995) [hereinafter
Foley, Misconceptions and Controversies].
64. See Tuttle, supra note 56, at 132.
65. See Foley, Treatment of Cancer Pain, supra note 54, at 88; Tuttle, supra note
56, at 132.
66. Foley, Controlling Pain, supra note 58, at 165.
67. See Tuttle, supra note 56, at 132.
68. See Steton Grond, M.D., et ai., Validation of World Health Organization
Guidelines for Cancer Pain Relief During the Last Days and Hours of Life, 6 J. PAIN &
SYMPTOM MGMT. 411, 419 (1991).
69. See, e.g., Foley, Treatment of Cancer Pain, supra note 54, at 84 (discussing
how to treat the severe pain associated with incurable cancer); Lo & Coleman,
supra note 62, at 828 (tracking the progress of a terminally ill cancer patient who
was given exceptionally high doses of narcotic analgesics to control chronic, severe pain and to overcome tolerance).
70. See Tuttle, supra note 56, at 132.
71. See id.
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utilize morphine and other analgesic drugs to relieve pain. Kathleen M. Foley, M.D., chief of the pain service in the department of
neurology at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York
City, has written several articles about the need to dispel the myths
and to deal with the lack of knowledge that result in the under72
treatment of pain in the dying patient. She attributes this under73
treatment to a number of factors. She relies on numerous studies
that "demonstrate a significant lack of knowledge in both the theoretical and practical understanding of analgesic drug therapy in
both acute pain and cancer pain management. ,,74 She cites poor
communication between doctors and patients about pain assess75
ment as another significant barrier to adequate treatment. She
also notes that the increase worldwide in the availability of morphine and other opioids has raised unsubstantiated fears that the
76
drugs will be diverted to the illicit market.
In many instances,
however, it is not just the lack of experience and knowledge that
impedes the provision of good palliative care at the end of life, but
also physicians' fears of legal liability and professional sanctions for
77
causing or hastening death.
III. THE LAw AND ETHICS OF TREATING THE TERMINALLY ILL
A.

Explicating Terminology to Define the Scope of the Problem

Initially, some language must be clarified. Much diverting and
inflammatory discussion of this subject already has resulted from
the inteIjection of terminology that is used improperly or defined

72. See, e.g., Foley, Misconceptions and Controversies, supra note 63, at 308;
Kathleen M. Foley, M.D., Pain Relief into Practice: Rhetoric Without Reform, 13 J.
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2149,2156 (1995) [hereinafter Foley, Pain Relief]; Foley, Controlling Pain, supra note 58, at 164.
73. See Foley, Misconceptions and Controversies, supra note 63, at 308.
74. Foley, Pain Relief, supra note 72, at 2149.
75. See Foley, Misconceptions and Controversies, supra note 63, at 309; Foley,
Pain Relief, supra note 72, at 2149; Foley, Controlling Pain, supra note 58, at 164.
76. See Foley, Misconceptions and Controversies, supra note 63, at 309. This
concern, among others, has prompted Dr. Steven Miles of the University of Minnesota Center for Biomedical Ethics to remark that "cancer patients have been
the victims of friendly fire in the war against drugs." Telephone Interview with
Steven H. Miles, M.D., Associate Professor, Department of Medicine and Center
for Biomedical Ethics, University of Minn. (Mar. 20,1997).
77. See Buchan & Tolle, supra note 22, at 57; see also infra Part IV.CD (discussing the appropriate role of criminal law in medical decision-making).
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poorly.78 "Euthanasia," as the term is used correctly, is the inten79
tional killing of a suffering person for reasons of compassion commonly referred to as "mercy killing.,,8{) Sometimes, this intentional killing also is called "active euthanasia,,,81 to distinguish it
82
from an act of withholding or withdrawing medical treatment.
The withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment is referred to
as "passive euthanasia,,,83 an utterly inappropriate and inflammatory
term for activities well recognized as legally and ethically justifi54
able. Although commentators long have used this active/passive
terminology to describe the critical distinction between active, intentional killing and the withdrawal or withholding of medical
treatment,85 it should be abandoned.
Euthanasia also must be distinguished from assisted suicide.
In assisted suicide, the one who is aiding does not do the ultimate
life-ending act, but instead provides or helps to provide the means
86
used by another person to end his or her own life. It may refer to
a family member who helps arrange some means of suicide,87 such
as giving a suffering relative a loaded gun. Other times, as in the
latest circuit court cases,88 assisted suicide may apply to a physician
who provides a suffering patient with sufficient medication and instructions for a life-ending dose. 89 The ultimate act, however, is
done by the person wishing to end his or her own life, not by the
90
one supplying the means. For many, a critical moral and ethical
distinction exists between euthanasia and assisted suicide, irrespec78. See Ezekiel]. Emanuel, Euthanasia: Historical, Ethical, and Empiric Perspectives, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1890, 1890 (1994).
79. See ROBERT I. MISBIN, EUTHANASIA: THE GOOD OF THE PATIENT, THE GOOD
OFSOCIElY 10 (1992).
80. See id. at 11-12.
81. See Emanuel, supra note 78, at 1891.
82. See id. at 1890-91.
83. [d. at 1891.
84. See id. (noting that the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment is supported by an ever-widening consensus of ethical literature and is
permitted by decisions in most states and by the Supreme Court).
85. SeeMIsBIN, supra note 79, at 11-14.
86. See Introduction to EUTHANASIA: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 12 (David Bender
et al. eds., 1995).
87. See id.
88. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 719 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36
(1996); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 794-95 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
89. See Introduction to EUTHANASIA: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, supra note 86, at
12.
90. See Pugliese, supra note 34, at 1291-92.
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91
tive of the law's treatment of each.
In Minnesota, both euthanasia and assisted suicide are illegal.
Although euthanasia is not defined anywhere in its statutes, such
an act of intentional, albeit compassionately motivated, killing
would constitute first-degree murder. 92 As in most other states,93 as91. See Garbesi, supra note 33, at 109-10.
92. See MINN. STAT. § 609.185 (1996) ("Whoever does any of the following is
guilty of murder in the first degree ... : (1) causes the death of a human being
with premeditation and with intent to effect the death of the person .... ").
93. At present, 35 states have statutes that explicitly criminalize assisted suicide. See ALAsKA STAT. § 11.41.120(a) (2) (Michie 1996); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §
13-1103(A)(3) (West 1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a) (2) (Michie 1993); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1997); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-104(1) (b) (Supp. 1996);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-56(a)(2) (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (1995);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5(b)-(c) (1996); HAw.
REv. STAT. Ac"IN. § 707-702(I)(b) (Michie 1993); 720 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/1231 (a)(2) (West Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2.5(b) (Michie Supp.
1996); RAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1995); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 216.302(2)(a)-(b)
(Michie 1995); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.12(A)(I)-(2) (West Supp. 1997); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204(1) (West 1983); MICH. COMPo LAws Ac"IN. §
752.1027(1)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. § 609.215(1) (1996); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.023(1)(2) (West Supp. 1997);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1995); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-307(1) (1995); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:4(1) (1996); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West 1995); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (Michie 1994); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.30 (McKinney 1987);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-04(1) (Supp. 1995); OKlA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 813
(West 1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2505(b) (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAws § 1160-3 (A) (a)-(b) (Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 22-16-37 (Michie 1988); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-216(a)(I)-(3) (Supp. 1996); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08(a)
(West 1994); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060(1) (West 1988); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.12 (West 1996).
Five states criminalize assisted suicide through the common law. See Crook V.
State, 160 So. 2d 884, 893 (Ala. Ct. App. 1961) ("Suicide is murder at [c]ommon
[l]aw .... An agreement compassing it is a criminal conspiracy. If one of the
conspirators dies, ... the survivor - if he contributed to the suicide whether present or not - can legitimately be found guilty of murder."); State V. Marti, 290
N.W.2d 570, 583 (Iowa 1980) ("We believe that preparing and providing a
weapon for one who is unable to do so and is known to be intoxicated and probably suicidal are acts 'likely to cause death or serious injury,' within the definition
of involuntary manslaughter found in section 707.5(2) [of the Iowa Code].");
State V. Willis, 121 S.E.2d 854,856-57 (N.C. 1961) ("Since suicide is a crime, one
who aids and abets another in, or is accessory before the fact to, self[-]murder is
amendable to the law."); Wackwitz V. Roy, 418 S.E.2d 861, 864 (Va. 1992)
("[A]lthough the General Assembly has rescinded the punishment for suicide, it
has not decriminalized the act. Suicide, therefore, remains a common law crime
in Virginia ....") ; Md. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 93-036 (Sept. 8, 1993) (conduding
that assisted suicide is probably a common-law crime in Maryland and recommending that the General Assembly promptly pass a statute prohibiting physicianassisted suicide).
Nine states address the subject in living will or death with dignity statutes.
These acts expressly state that the government neither condones nor legalizes as-
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94
sisted suicide also is prohibited by statute in Minnesota. Nevertheless, the statute now makes an exception for health care providers who attempt to relieve patients' pain.95
The 1989 Minnesota investigations involved two deaths follow96
ing the use of morphine. The medical examiner ruled the deaths
97
homicides. This ruling required a determination that the morphine was, in each case, the cause of death98 and that its administra99
tion in the quantities given was wrongful. A successful criminal
prosecution of these cases would have required proof that the doctors either (1) directly intended to kill the patients, so as to be
guilty of first-degree murder,loo or (2) were so culpably negligent in
their use of the drug in such quantities as to be guilty of manlOl
slaughter in the second degree.
sisted suicide or euthanasia. See IDAHO CODE § 39-152 (Supp. 1996); MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 2010, § 12 (Law. Co-op. 1994); NEV. REv. STAT. § 449.670(2) (1995);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2133.12(A) (Anderson Supp. 1996); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 4478-50 (A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1118 (1993); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5260 (1987); W. VA. CODE § 16-308-2(2) (b) (1995); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 3-5-211 (Michie Supp. 1996).
Only Oregon has passed, by referendum, legislation explicitly permitting
physicians to prescribe medication for use by a terminally ill patient to commit
suicide. See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.005-.995 (1995). The statute was challenged on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds, and on August 3, 1995, in Lee v. Oregon, 891 F.
Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995), it was declared unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's
judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint for
lack of jurisdiction. See Lee v. Oregon, Nos. 95-35804, 95-35948, 95-35805; 9535949,95-35854,1997 WL 80783, at *8 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 1997).
94. See MINN. STAT. § 609.215, subd. 1 (1996) ("Whoever intentionally advises, encourages, or assists another in taking the other's own life may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 15 years or to payment of a fine of not
more than $30,000 or both.").
95. See id. subd. (3) (a) (providing immunity for health care workers in certain circumstances); see also infra notes 302-03 and accompanying text.
96. See Mark Brunswick, Homicide Rulings Raise Questions About Drug Treatment
o/Terminally Ill, STAR TRrB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 30, 1989, at 1A.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See David Shaffer, Hennepin County Report Urges Painkiller Guidelines, ST.
PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 1990, at 1B.
100. See MINN. STAT. § 609.185 (1996) (providing that a person is guilty of
first-degree murder if he or she "causes the death of a human being with premeditation and with intent to effect the death of the person or of another").
101. See id. § 609.205 ("A person who causes the death of another by any of
the following means is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree ... : (1) by
the person's culpable negligence whereby the person creates an unreasonable
risk, and consciously takes chances of causing death or great bodily harm to another.").
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The Minnesota Morphine Investigations

In the spring of 1989, two patients in separate hospitals in
Hennepin County, Minnesota, died following the withdrawal of
their mechanical respirators and the administration of relatively
102
large doses of morphine to ease the attendant suifering.
Both
patients were imminently dying and required the assistance of a
lOg
mechanical ventilator to breathe. In each case, the ventilator was
l04
withdrawn pursuant to the patient's direction.
One patient had
executed a living will.l05 The other had expressed his wishes in a
family conference shortly before his death.106 Following expressions of concern by some attending health care workers about the
amounts of morphine given, the Hennepin County Medical Examiner reviewed both cases.107 The examiner ruled both deaths homicide by morphine poisoning,108 a finding sharply criticized by the
Minnesota Medical Association and disputed by legal experts. 109 After extensive, thoughtful investigation, the Hennepin County Attorney declined to present the cases to a grand jury for criminal
•
110
prosecutlOn.
The cases sparked intense debate and concern in the medical
•
111
'
. th e press. 112 I n fl ammatory
commumty
and
actIve
comment III

102.
103.
104.

See Slovut, supra note 29, at lB.
See id.
See David Shaffer, Two Hennepin Agencies Urge Guidelines on Painkillers,
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISP., Apr. 25, 1990, at lB.
105. See id.
106. SeeSlovut, supra note 29, at lB.
107. See id.
108. See Miriam K. Feldman, Pain Control in Dying Patients, MINN. MED., Oct.
1990, at 19,20.
109. See id. Feldman argues that because of the Minnesota investigations,
patients are not receiving adequate pain relief and that it "will continue to happen until physicians learn more about pain management and about the legal and
ethical precedent that supports good medical judgment." Id. at 20.
110. For former Hennepin County Attorney Tom Johnson's account of the
investigations and his reasons for declining to prosecute these cases, see Johnson,
supra note 24, at 10-11. Johnson felt that a first-degree murder charge would fail,
because it requires the state to prove that the death was intentional and premeditated. Intent is difficult to prove because of the ethical maxim known as the
"principle of the double effect." The principle permits the administration of
pain-killing drugs to a dying patient even if it is foreseeable that the medication
could shorten the patient's life. See id. at 11; see also infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
111. See Feldman, supra note 108, at 19.
112. See, e.g., Arthur Caplan, Nazi Analogy Is Inaccurate and Offensive, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Apr. 30, 1990, at lC.
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rhetoric abounded. The self-proclaimed "pro-life" movement immediately labeled the cases instances of active euthanasia. m Much
of the medical community, already feeling beleaguered by malpractice claims, now believed it also had to fear criminal liability
for some very common end-of-life medical treatment decisions.1I4
Physicians caring for dying patients saw their judgments being subjected to review not only by civil lawyers examining negligence
claims, but by prosecuting authorities looking for crime as well. In
the ensuing years, considerable anecdotal evidence from local hospitals has shown that some terminally ill cancer patients have been
medicated inadequately for pain, because their doctors have feared
being subjected either to a criminal investigation or to an inquiry
1I5
from the state's medical licensing board.
As one hospice nurseadministrator remarked, the investigations "set palliative care back
,,116
filve years.
The investigations, though not unprecedented, were highly
unusual. They raised questions whose resolution lay at the inter1l7
section of law, medicine, and ethics.
It became clear rather
quickly that little guidance on the precise issue exists. Considerable literature is available on the ethical issues involved in decisions
to forego life-sustaining treatment of terminally ill patients. liS In
addition, a well-developed body of case law supporting such deci1I9
sions exists.
Precious little has been written, however, to help
physicians implement decisions to withdraw or withhold specific
interventions, while at the same time providing their dying patients

113. See Terminally Ill: Don't Let Painkiller Rules Chill Final Care, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Apr. 30, 1990, at lOA.
114. See Cook & Parker, supra note 31, at 1A.
115. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 108, at 20; Walter Parker, Medicine, Law
Clash over Morphine, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Oct. 2, 1989, at 1A.
116. Interview with Kate Cummings, R.N., Metropolitan Medical Center
(Spring 1989).
117. See Garbesi, supra note 33, at 109-10.
118. See, e.g., H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS
(1986); ETHICS AND LAw IN HEALTH CARE AND RESEARCH (Peter Byrne ed., 1990);
EUTHANASIA: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS (David Bender et al. eds., 1995).
119. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79
(1990) (recognizing that a "competent person has a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment"); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647, 663 (NJ.) (concluding that the unwritten constitutional right of privacy includes an individual's right to refuse unwanted medical interventions), eert. denied,
429 U.S. 922 (1976); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977) (recognizing that ethical medical practice does not
require that all life-prolonging interventions be attempted in all cases).
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120
with good palliative care.
This guidance void has created considerable misunderstanding in the medical community.
Consequently, this misunderstanding has led members of the medical
community to fear the potential legal repercussions if practitioners
121
exceed what they perceive as murky boundaries.
The investigations in the morphine cases fueled those fears.
C.

The Law of Treatment Withdrawal
1.

The Courts' Response to Treatment Withdrawal

Each of the Minnesota investigations involved the withdrawal
of a mechanical ventilator from a dying patient, whose previously
122
expressed wishes were being honored.
In this respect, the cases
were perhaps the least controversial of any at the intersection of
biomedical ethics and the law.123 It is well-settled that a competent
adult patient has the right to forego any life-prolonging interven124
tion. This right of autonomous decision-making has been upheld
repeatedly and has been grounded in both the constitutional right
to privacy125 and the common-law right to bodily self-

120. See Feldman, supra note 108, at 20. In recent years, palliative care specialists have developed guidelines for the aggressive management of pain and suffering at the end of life, but it still appears that most physicians are not familiar
with them. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Wanzer, Physician's Responsibility, supra note 24, at 956 (stating
that physicians fail to treat the pain of dying patients adequately because of their
fear of criminal sanctions).
122. See Shaffer, supra note 104, at lB.
123. The most controversial cases usually involve the withdrawal of tubes
which supply nutrition and hydration from incompetent patients who have expressed no preferences about such care. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); State v. Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995); In reWestchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d
607 (N.Y. 1988).
124. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 (Ct. App.
1986) (holding that a mentally competent patient had the right to remove a nasogastric tube involuntarily inserted into her body, even though the patient was not
terminally ill); Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017,1024 (Mass. 1991) (asserting that a state's interest in protecting the well-being of the patient's child did
not outweigh the patient's right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment).
125. See, e.g., Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301 (affirming that an individual's basic right to refuse medical treatment is recognized as part of the federal and state
constitutional rights to privacy); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220,
225 (Ct. App. 1984) (stating that the right of a competent adult patient to refuse
medical treatment originated in the constitutional right to privacy); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977)
(stating that a person's constitutional right to privacy encompasses the right to
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126

determination.
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court, in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department oj Health,127 acknowledged
that a competent patient has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment as well. 128 The right
to refuse treatment has been upheld even in the case of an incompetent patient whose family or court-appointed guardian requests
the withdrawal of treatment on the patient's behalf, either because
it is what the patient would have wanted,l29 or because it is in the
patient's best interests. ISO
refuse "unwanted infringements of bodily integrity in appropriate circumstances"); Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663 (stating that the constitutional right to privacy
is broad enough to include a patient's decision to refuse medical treatment in
certain circumstances).
126. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1099 (Kan.) (recognizing
that because Anglo-American law is premised on self-determination, a patient may
refuse lifesaving surgery or other medical treatment), clari[zed, 354 P.2d 670 (Kan.
1960); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947,950 (Me. 1987) (reiterating the long-standing
common-law right of every individual to control his or her own person without
interference from others); Schloendorffv. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92,93
(N.Y. 1914) ("Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his [or her] own body.").
127. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
128. !d. at 278 ("The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.").
129. See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 587-88 (D.R.1. 1988) (concluding that in balancing the patient's constitutional right to refuse life support
against the competing governmental interest, one must consider evidence that if
the patient were competent, she would decline life support); In re Estate of
Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 300 (Ill. 1989) (holding that the key element in determining whether to allow withdrawal of artificial sustenance is proof, by clear
and convincing evidence, of the patient's intent); Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986) (taking into account the patient's views
pertaining to life support when ascertaining whether to honor the substituted
judgment of an incompetent person in a persistent vegetative state to refuse the
continuance of life support); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass. 1977) (holding that courts should attempt
to determine the incompetent person's preferences regarding medical treatment); Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664 (holding that the only practical way for an incompetent patient to assert the privacy right to terminate treatment is for a guardian to determine whether the patient would have wanted to exercise that right);
In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607,613 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that
the decision to withhold or withdraw treatment must always be based on the patient's expressed intentions).
130. See, e.g., In re Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 857 (Ct.
App. 1988) (holding that California law allows a conservator of an incompetent
person in a vegetative state to withdraw artificial life support if the withdrawal is in
the patient's best interests); In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 337
(Minn. 1984) (stating that a court may allow a conservator to order the removal of
life support if it is in the patient's best interests); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209,
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The Cruzan case involved the withdrawal of medical interventions from an incompetent patient. lSI Nancy Cruzan had been in a
132
persistent vegetative state for almost eight years when her parents, as her legal guardians, sought court permission to end her artificial feeding. 133 The Missouri Supreme Court required the
Cruzans to prove by clear and convincing evidence that their
daughter would have wanted her feeding tube disconnected under
l34
the circumstances.
This proof of Nancy's wishes was to be
gleaned from her prior expressions. 135 On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court recognized in dictum a constitutionally protected right in the competent patient to refuse unwanted medical
treatment and indicated that a competent person might have a lib136
erty interest in refusing artificially-delivered fluids and nutrition.
Nevertheless, it upheld Missouri's very stringent evidentiary requirement that when a guardian seeks to have a feeding tube withdrawn from a permanently unconscious patient, there must be
clear and convincing proof that the patient would want to have the
137
feeding tube withdrawn.
The Cruzan case must be carefully distinguished from the vast
majority of treatment termination cases which have come before
the courts and from the two Minnesota cases discussed previously.
Cruzan involved the withdrawal of a feeding tube from a patient
who was permanently unconscious, but not dying, and whose
wishes on the subject, it was argued, could not be reliably deter-

1232 (NJ. 1985) (ruling that in the absence of evidence indicating the patient's
intent to decline medical treatment, life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or
withdrawn from a formerly competent person if the burden of treatment outweighs its benefit).
131. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 265.
132. [d. at 266.
133. [d. at 265.
134. [d.
135. [d. at 268.
136. [d. at 278-79.
137. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284 (concluding that a state "may apply a clear and
convincing evidence standard in proceedings where a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration of a person diagnosed to be in a persistent vegetative state"). Mter the Supreme Court issued its decision, another hearing was
held before a county probate judge to determine whether, under the newly articulated "clear and convincing" standard, sufficient evidence of Nancy'S wishes
existed to justify removing the feeding tube. The judge ruled that there was sufficient evidence, and the state did not appeal. Tlie tube was removed, and Nancy
Cruzan died on December 26, 1990, 11 days later. See 1 ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT
TO DIE § 2.3, at 4445 (2d ed. 1995).
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mined. ISS Further, the Cruzan decision merely affirmed the Mis139
souri Supreme Court opinion.
It does not affect the law in any
other state. 140 It is also significant to note that the Cruzan case involved artificial feeding, 141 an intervention about which there is not
full societal consensus.142 Tube feeding involves important emotional factors, largely the result of the symbolism we attach to providing sustenance to the vulnerable, that are not present in cases
143
involving mechanical ventilators.
2.

Withdrawal of Ventilators: Why Courts Treat It Differently

Perhaps the most famous case involving the removal of a respil44
rator from a patient is that of Karen Ann Quinlan.
On April 15,
1975, Karen was taken to the hospital after she "ceased breathing
for at least two fifteen minute periods.,,145 Thereafter, her condition worsened and it was determined that she was in a chronic, persistent vegetative state, needing twenty-four hour intensive nursing
care and the assistance of a respirator, a catheter, and a feeding
tube. 146 Joseph Quinlan, Karen's father, wished to be appointed
guardian of his daughter and to be allowed to authorize the dis147
continuance of her ventilator support.
In a landmark decision,
the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed her parents to order her
138.
139.

See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 265-69.
See id. at 287.
140. See JAMES M. HOEFLER & BRIAN E. KAMOIE, DEATHRIGHT: CULTURE,
MEDICINE, POUTICS, AND THE RIGHT TO DIE 182-83 (1994); Alan Meisel, A Retrospective on Cruzan, 20 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 340, 343, 345 (1992) (observing that
the Court, in rendering its decision, focused solely on the validity of the Missouri
Supreme Court's holding, but failed to promulgate a national policy).
141. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 26l.
142. See GEORGE M. BURNELL, M.D., FINAL CHOICES: To LIVE OR TO DIE IN AN
AGE OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY lO6-11 (1993) (discussing the competing viewpoints
as to whether providing food and water is a necessary and ordinary treatment).
143. See Bryan Jennett, Letting Vegetative Patients Die, in EUTHANASIA
EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CUNICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 169, 181-82 Oohn Keown
ed., 1995); see also Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (Ct. App.
1983) (recognizing that the distinction between cases involving mechanical
breathing devices and those involving mechanical feeding devices is based more
on emotional symbolism than on rational differences).
144. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
The Quinlan court determined that under appropriate circumstances, a comatose
patient's family may order the removal of the patient's ventilator. Id. at 651.
145. Id. at 653-54. The reason why Karen stopped breathing is still unclear.
Id.
146. Id. at 654.
147. Id. at 651.
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14B
respirator disconnected.
The court determined that the state's
interest in the preservation and the sanctity of human life was outweighed by Karen's individual right to decline medical treatment
under such circumstances, a right which her family could exercise
149
on her behalf.
Since In re Quinlan, decisions to forego ventilator
150
use have been readily upheld.
The use of ventilators to keep patients alive always has been
considered highly unnatural, intrusive and, in the language of the
Catholic Church, "extraordinary."l5l Traditionally, Catholic moral
theology drew a distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordi152
nary" means of preserving life. The term "ordinary means" refers
to "all medicines, treatments and operations, which offer a reasonable hope of benefit for the patient and which can be obtained and
used without excessive expense, pain or other inconvenience.,,153
"Extraordinary means" are "all medicines, treatments, and operations, which cannot be obtained or used without excessive expense,
pain, or other inconvenience, or which, if used, would not offer a

148. /d. at 671.
149. Id. at 663-64. This individual right arises when the attending physician
and the facility ethics committee agree that: 1) there is no reasonable possibility
of the patient ever emerging from the comatose condition to a cognitive state;
and 2) the life-support apparatus should be discontinued. Id. at 671-72. The
court further noted that the decision ultimately rested with Karen. But since she
was grossly incompetent and thus unable to assert her rights, her guardian or family members could render their best judgment as to whether Karen would exercise
her right to discontinue treatment in these circumstances. Id. at 664.
150. See, e.g., McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 625 (Nev. 1990) (holding
that the patient's liberty interest in refusing the use of a respirator to sustain his
life outweighed the state's interest in preserving his life); In re Eichner, 420
N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y. 1981) (approving the withdrawal of a patient's respirator
where the patient had expressed his views prior to becoming incompetent); In re
Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 454 (Wash. 1987) (stating that the right to refuse lifesustaining treatment extends to all artificial procedures intended to prolong the
life of a terminally ill patient, including a ventilator), modifzed, 757 P.2d 534
(Wash. 1988).
151. See GERALD KELLY, MEDICo-MORAL PROBLEMS 129 (1958). The Roman
Catholic Church is by far the largest single religious body in the United States. See
Reverend Richard E. Coleson, Contemporary Religious Viewpoints on Suicide, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 35 DUQ. L. REv. 43, 45 (1996).
Its views are significant for several reasons, including "the church's (1) long history of moral scholarship; (2) extensive and articulate contemporary pronouncements on moral issues; (3) large and influential worldwide presence; and (4)
strongly hierarchical structure, which permits a central authority to speak authoritatively for the church.» Id. at 45 n.11.
152. See KELLY, supra note 151, at 129.
153. Id.
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reasonable hope of benefit.,,154 This distinction between ordinary
and extraordinary means remains important, and the Catholic
Church continues to be an articulate, well-respected authority on
issues relating to termination of treatment in the dying patient. 155
The "extraordinary/ordinary" language, however, has been abandoned in virtually all medical ethics writings and in most court decisions, in favor of a discussion that evaluates the treatment intervention by weighing the burdens it imposes against the benefits it
.
156
may dllord to th e patIent.
Ethically, the obligation to sustain life, while an important one
for the medical profession, is not absolute. Not only does the doctrine of proportionality temper this duty, it also is necessary to
evaluate the responsibility to sustain life in light of the duty to
157
promote patient well-being.
In other words, the duty to promote
patient well-being requires an assessment of whether a lifesustaining intervention will prove more beneficial than burden15S
some to the patient.
This assessment, and decisions about the
withdrawal or refusal of the intervention, reside primarily with the
159
patient or his legal surrogate, rather. than with the physician.
Barber v. Superior Court>!) emphasizes this point.
The patient in Barber suffered severe brain damage, leaving
161
him in a likely permanent vegetative state.
The patient's family,

-=

154. [d.
155. Other religions have different views. For example, Judaism does not
permit euthanasia because of its strong belief in the preservation of life. Many
Rabbinic interpretations, however, conclude that Judaism does permit suicide and
the withdrawal of life support if the patient is near death and in great pain. Islam
also endorses the principle that life should be preserved. Therefore, it does not
permit suicide, euthanasia, or the withdrawal of life support. See Matthew P. Previn, Note, Assisted Suicide and Religion: Conflicting Conceptions of the Sanctity of Human Life, 84 CEO. LJ. 589, 596-97 (1996).
156. See, e.g., 1 MEISEL, supra note 137, § 8.14, at 502 (stating that when deciding whether to forego life-sustaining treatment, the balancing approach is the
most frequently used); Wanzer, A Second Look, supra note 22, at 846; see also Barber
v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (Ct. App. 1983) (weighing the benefits
of the proposed treatment against the burdens it would impose on the patient).
157. See Wanzer, A Second Look, supra note 22, at 846. "Somewhere between
the unacceptable extremes offailure to treat the dying patient and intolerable use
of aggressive life-sustaining measures, the physician must seek a level of care that
optimizes comfort and dignity." [d.
158. See id.
159. See Wanzer, Physician's Responsibility, supra note 24, at 955.
160. 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1983).
161. [d. at 486. The patient suffered a cardio-respiratory arrest and was revived, but remained in a comatose state. After examining him, the physicians determined that the patient also had suffered brain damage and that his vegetative
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upon learning of the dim prognosis for recovery, requested in writing that the hospital discontinue the use of all life support ma162
chines.
Responding to the family's wishes, two doctors removed
165
the ventilator and other life-sustaining equipment.
Mter the patient died, the doctors were charged with murder and conspiracy to
. murd er. 164
commit
In determining whether the two doctors should be held to answer the charges, the court considered whether the doctors had a
165
duty to continue to provide life-sustaining treatment.
The court
held that no duty to continue the use of life-sustaining machines
exists once their use has become "futile in the opinion of qualified
medical personnel.,,166 Continued life support becomes futile or
"disproportionate," the court said, when the benefits to be gained
from the proposed treatment are outweighed by the burdens to
167
which it would subject the patient.
"[PJroportionate treatment is
that which, in the view of the patient, has at least a reasonable chance
of providing benefits to the patient, which benefits outweigh the
burdens attendant to the treatment."I68 The court acknowledged
that the determination as to whether the burdens of treatment are
worth enduring for any individual patient depends on the unique
.
f
h
169
CIrcumstances
0 eac case.
Thus, the Barber court recognized that a ventilator may be discontinued when the burdens of the intervention are greater than
the b~nefits.170 The patient should be the ultimate decision-maker
regarding the burden issue, unless the patient is incapable of making this decision due to his or her medical condition or for other
l7l
reasons.
It is important to keep in mind, then, that ventilatordependent patients are legally and ethically entitled to decide to
have their ventilator support withdrawn and to die.172 The critical
state was likely to be pennanent. ld.
162. ld.
163. ld.
164. ld.
165. ld. at 490.
166. Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
167. ld.
168. ld. (emphasis added).
169. ld. at 492.
170. ld.
171. ld. The court admitted difficulty in detennining who should have the
power to make the decision when the patient is incapacitated; however, it implied
that the decision should reside with the patient's family. ld.
172. See cases cited supra note 150; see also Wanzer, Physician's Responsibility,
supra note 24, at 955 (addressing the importance of the patient's role in decision-
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question is what procedures physicians should follow when withdrawing such ventilator support.
The answer to this question is of crucial importance for ventilator-dependent patients who are dying. The "air-hunger" or suffocation that characterizes the dying of a ventilator-dependent patient from whom breathing support has been withdrawn is a
peculiar and acute suffering.m Morphine is well-accepted as the
174
most effective palliative drug to alleviate this distress.
Often,
however, dying patients needlessly suffer because of the inadequate
administration of morphine and other opioid pain-relieving medi175
cations. A variety of reasons have been offered for physicians' re176
luctance to medicate adequately in this situation. It is clear, however, that misconceptions about both the use of morphine and the
application of the criminal law to such situations have contributed
to the problem. 177
It would, of course, be unjustifiable homicide for doctors deliberately to give patients an overdose of narcotics or sedatives for
the purpose of ending life quickly.17s Yet, after the ventilator is
withdrawn, it becomes the physician's ethical responsibility to provide whatever amount of medication is necessary to relieve any apparent symptoms of pain and suffering, so as to make the dying
l79
process comfortable and peaceful.
Indeed, the ethics literature
emphasizes that once curative efforts have been discontinued, the
physician's primary goal in caring for dying patients is to relieve
their pain and suffering. ISO If, in so doing, a physician administers
making).
173. See Feldman, supra note 108, at 20.
174. See Foley, Misconceptions and Controversies, supra note 63, at 6 (noting
that morphine is the preferred drug according to the World Health Organization's Cancer Pain Guidelines).
175. See supra notes 5~71 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subd. 9(3) (1996). If the physician's
purpose is to end the patient's life, rather than relieve pain, then the "intentional" element of homicide is satisfied. See id. But if. MEISEL, supra note 137, §
18.18, at 479 ("The taking of the life of another person by some affirmative
act ... , regardless of the fact that the motive may be the relief of suffering, is culpable homicide.").
.
179. See Buchan & Tolle, supra note 22, at 54-55; Wanzer, A Second Look, supra note 22, at 847 ("The proper dose of pain medication is the dose that is sufficient to relieve pain and suffering, even to the point of unconsciousness.").
180. See THE HAsTINGS CENTER, GUIDEUNES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFESUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 74 (1987); Wanzer, A Second
Look, supra note 22, at 84M7. See generally THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE
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morphine in such amounts that he or she hastens death by depressing the patient's respiration, no liability arises. lSI Ethically and legally, a physician's actions are protected if the intent was to relieve
suffering, even though as a necessary incident, the patient's life is
shortened. 182
D.

The Principle of Double Effect

The problem of administering pain medication to dying patients is an old one in medical ethics. The principles which govern
it have a long and respected tradition beginning, it is believed, with
ls3
St. Thomas Aquinas' notion of praeter intentionem. As it has come
to be known, the principle of double effect is used to analyze the
morality of actions that involve more than one effect, specifically
IS4
one good and one evil consequence. The principle of double effect states that an action that has an evil consequence as well as a
good one can be justified if it satisfies four conditions:
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
REsEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING 'TREATMENT: ETHICAL, MEDICAL
AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION] (reporting on the ethical, medical, and legal issues in treatment decisions).
181. See Wanzer, A Second Look, supra note 22, at 847.
182. Some physicians have recognized in themselves what Dr. Timothy Quill
has called the "ambiguity of clinical intention." Timothy E. Quill, M.D., The Ambiguity ofClinicalIntfmtions, 329 NEWENG.J. MEn. 1039, 1039 (1993). That is, when
they give heavy narcotics to relieve their patients' severe suffering, these physicians are aware that in addition to a desire to relieve the patients' pain, they
sometimes harbor feelings that death would not be unwelcome. Indeed, they may
often hope that death will come sooner, rather than later, to these desperately ill
patients. See id. Still, for purposes of the criminal law, intfmt requires more than
the knowledge that there is an increased risk of hastening death and an ancillary
hope that the patient's suffering will not continue too long. "'Intentionally'
means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result
specified [i.e., the death of the patient] or believes that the act ... , if successful, will
cause that result." MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subd. 9(3) (1996) (emphasis added).
Knowing that an increased risk of death from large doses of some medications exists - even when the belief that the patient's death would be a good thing accompanies that knowledge - does not constitute the required mental state in these
cases.
183. See THE WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 162 Games F.
Childress & John Macquarrie eds., 1986) (defining praeter intfmtionem to mean a
resulting wrong or evil consequence of an action which is "not directly sought" or
"an unintended by-product of the action"); Kevin J. Flannery, Natural Law Mens
Rea Versus the Benthamite Tradition, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 377, 394 n.52 (1995) (stating
that praeter intfmtionem means a wrongful consequence of an action which is "outside the intention" of that action).
184. See Flannery, supra note 183, at 394-95 nn.52 & 54.
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(1) The action from which evil results is good or indifferent in itself; it is not morally evil. (2) The intention of the
agent is upright - i.e., the evil effect is sincerely not intended. (3) The evil effect must be equally immediate
causally with the good effect, for otherwise it would be a
means to the good effect and would be intended. (4)
There must be a proportionately grave reason for allowing the evil to occur. IS
The use of morphine in the dying patient is a classic illustration of the principle in action. The good effect of the morphine is
the relief of suffering; the bad effect is the possible hastening of
death. The first element of the principle of double effect is met
because when the physician administers morphine to the patient,
the physician does not bring about the relief of suffering by means
of weakening the patient's condition. Thus, the evil effect is not the
means to the desired effect and the action is not morally evil. The
second condition also is satisfied. The intent of the doctor is to relieve the patient's suffering, not to kill the patient. The adverse effect, possibly hastening the patient's death, comes from dangers
inherent in the use of the drug and is not intended; rather; it is a
necessary risk. Third, both the good and the evil effects result simultaneously. The risk of speeding the patient's death occurs at
the same time as the benefit of relieving the patient's pain. Finally,
the relief of suffering in the dying patient is critically important.
The physician's primary duty is to relieve the patient's pain and
suffering once curative efforts have ceased. This duty provides ample reason for using the morphine in whatever dosage is necessary
IS6
to accomplish that goal.
Therefore, the principle of double ef-

185. THE WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS, supra note 183, at
162; accord ENGELHARDT, supra note 118, at 307. It is interesting to note that in his
second trial for assisted suicide, Dr. Kevorkian asserted - despite his prior public
statements to the contrary - that his goal was primarily to relieve suffering, and
that the deaths were an unavoidable consequence of that goal. See Kevorkian Says
He's Like an Executioner, FLA. TODAY, Mar. 5, 1996, at 6A; Barbara Dority, "In the
Hands of the People": Recent Victories of the Death-with-Dignity Movement, HUMANIST,
July 17, 1996, at 6. It is difficult to see how, even under the most generous interpretation of his actions, the principle of double effect would apply to protect Kevorkian. The first requirement of double effect is that the evil effect (the death of
the patient) must not be the means to produce the good effect (the relief of suffering). See ENGELHARDT, supra note 118, at 307. No one could seriously contend
that potassium chloride (whose only purpose when used this way is to stop a beating heart) and carbon monoxide are pain relief medications which carry a necessary and unavoidable risk of death.
186. See JOHN ARRAs & NANCY RHODEN, ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE
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fect fully justifies the use of enough morphine and other analgesic
drugs to relieve pain in terminally ill patients, even at the risk of
shortening their lives.
IV. EXAGGERATED FEARs OF CRIMINAL LIABILI'IY
In many cases, medical professionals have a greatly exaggerated fear of legal liability.ls7 It is possible to put these fears into
perspective, however, by understanding just how infrequently doctors have been charged with criminal conduct in connection with
medical treatment decisions of any kind, including those which
have involved intentional killings and are clear cases of murder. 188
l89
Notably, no physician has ever lost a civil case or been crimil90
nally convicted based on a decision to withhold or withdraw
191
treatment from a terminally ill patient.
Even more remarkable,
no doctor has ever been successfully prosecuted for a direct act of
euthanasia. 192 Even among the relatively small number of nonmedical defendants charged with "mercy killing," convictions are
rare,193 sentences that amount to anything significant are rarer
'11 194 an d JUry
.
SO,
nullifi"
Icaoon IS common. 195

27 (3d ed. 1989) and THE WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS, supra
note 183, at 162, for good discussions of this principle. The Roman Catholic
Church has approved the specific applicability of the principle of double effect to
the use of narcotics to relieve suffering in the dying. See THE WESTMINSTER
DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS, supra note 183, at 163.
187. See Buchan & Tolle, supra note 22, at 57 ("To our knowledge, no physician in the United States has ever been convicted of murder or assisted suicide for
providing a patient with appropriate high-dose pain medication."); Wanzer, Physician's Responsibility, supra note 24, at 956 (noting that criminal charges against
physicians who withdraw life support are rare).
188. See Glantz, supra note 24, at 231, for an excellent discussion of this issue and a review of some of the cases.
189. See id. at 235-36.
190. See id. at 232, 240; Wanzer, Physician's Responsibility, supra note 24, at
956.
191. See Glantz, supra note 24, at 235.
192. See id. at 232-34.
193. See id. (listing cases involving "mercy killings" by non-medical defendants).
194. See id. at 234. For example, the author cites a case involving a father
who killed his bedridden son using chloroform. The jury convicted the defendant of second-degree manslaughter, but the defendant was given a suspended
sentence and released. See id. at 232.
195. See id. at 232-33 (noting several cases in which the grand jury refused to
indict or acquit based on temporary insanity).
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Cases Involving Intentional Killing by Physicians

Few physicians and other health care providers have ever been
charged criminally with intentionally killing a patient. One of the
few cases involved Dr. Herman Sander, who, in 1950, injected air
into the veins of a terminally ill cancer patient. 196 Dr. Sander noted
in the patient's chart: "Patient was given 10 C.c. of air intravenously
repeated four times. Expired within ten minutes after this was
started." 197 Despite the clear evidence and the obvious homicidal
(albeit benignly motivated) intent of the defendant, he was acquit19B
ted.
Other cases have had similar results. In 1973, a jury acquitted
Dr. Vincent Montemarano of killing a cancer patient with an injecl99
tion of potassium chloride.
In 1981, Anne Capute, a nurse, was
charged with murdering a suffering, terminally ill patient by ad20o
ministering large doses of morphine.
Like Dr. Sander, Ms.
Capute carefully had documented her acts with respect to the patient, noting that she gave the patient 195 milligrams of morphine
201
within seven hours of death.
The prosecution presented four
medical experts who testified that the morphine caused the patient's death.202 Still, the jury acquitted the nurse. 203 In 1986, Dr.
Peter Rosier administered a morphine overdose to his terminally ill
wife but was unsuccessful in causing her death.204 He was acquitted,
205
however, for his role in attempting to assist in her suicide.
Other recent cases have had different results, but still no jury
206
verdicts of guilty and no prison sentences.
In 1986, Dr. Joseph
Hassman was charged with manslaughter after injecting his termi196. See id. at 233.
197. Glantz, supra note 24, at 233.
198. See id. (noting that 90% of the townspeople signed a petition supporting the doctor).
199. See id.
200. See id. at 234.
201. See id.
202. See id. To rebut the prosecution's evidence, the defense called three
medical experts who testified that cancer and heart and lung disease caused the
patient's death. See id.
203. See Glantz, supra note 24, at 234.
204. See Jim Persels, Farcing the Issue of Physician-Assisted Suicide: Impact of the
Kevarkian Case on the Euthanasia Debate, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 93, 112 (1993).
205. See id. Because Dr. Rosier's efforts failed to kill his wife, her stepfather
finished the task by suffocating her with a pillow. See id. at 112 n.152.
206. See id. at 110-12; T. Howard Stone & William J. Winslade, PhysicianAssisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the United States: Legal and Ethical Observations, 16
J. LEGALMED. 481, 493-94 (1995).
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nally ill mother-in-law with an overdose of Demeroeo He pled
2oB
guilty and was given two years probation.
In 1988, Dr. Donald
Caracdo was charged with murder after injecting a patient with po209
tassium chloride.
Dr. Caraccio pled guilty and was sentenced to
210
·
filve years pro b aUon.
In England, the story has been much the same. 211 In 1981, Dr.
Leonard Arthur acceded to the request of parents of a Down's
Syndrome infant that the baby be allowed to die.212 The infant died
after sixty-nine hours without being fed and after being given dihy213
drocodeine, an opiate drug, to alleviate his distress.
Mter being
charged with murder, Dr. Arthur contended that the death was due
214
to Down's Syndrome-induced broncho-pneumonia.
The prosecution asserted, however, that lung stasis resulting from the drug's
toxicity was the cause of death.215 In one of the few English prose216
cutions of a physician to go to a jury, Dr. Arthur was acquitted.
More recently, in 1986, a jury acquitted another physician of attempted murder after he administered barbiturates to a patient
suffering from inoperable lung cancer.217
In the earliest and most infamous English case, Dr. John Bodkin Adams was prosecuted for causing a patient's death by adminis218
tering excessive doses of heroin and morphine.
The court instructed the jury that the law does not recognize a special defense
for acting to prevent severe pain.219 It continued, however, by stating that a doctor need not calculate in any precise manner the effect of medicines upon a patient's life and may do all that is necessary at the end of life to relieve suffering, even employing measures
that may "incidentally shorten human life.,,220 "If a person is being
treated for an illness and that treatment has the incidental effect of
207. See Persels, supra note 204, at 112.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See DAVID W. MEYERS, THE HUMAN BODY AND THE LAw 282-83 (2d ed.
1990) (detailing cases of English physicians who brought about the deaths of patients through prescription drugs).
212. See id. at 282.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 283.
217. See MEYERS, supra note 211, at 282.
218. See id. at 283.
219. See id.
220. Id.
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determining the exact moment of death, it could not be said that
the doctor caused the patient's death.,,221 The jury returned a verdict of not. guilty. 222 Other countries have been similarly reluctant
to prosecute physicians for helping terminally ill patients end their
223
·
1Ives.
In many of the cases in which physicians have been charged
with intentional killings, the defendants were acquitted following
defenses asserting that the prosecution was unable to prove causa224
tion.
It is unclear whether these were actually cases in which the
prosecution had difficulty proving causation beyond, a reasonable
doubt - a very real possibility given the extreme cirtumstances of
225
the patients - or were simply cases of jury nullification corresponding with feelings of compassion. In any event, the inability of
the state to procure convictions in these cases of direct medical killing suggests that, absent very aggravated facts, the prosecution always has an uphill battle.

221. Id. at 284.
222. See id. at 283.
223. While assisted suicide is illegal in the Netherlands, its physicians openly
practice it. If doctors follow the Royal Dutch Medical Association's strict procedures, the government will not prosecute them. However, assisted suicide is considered as a treatment choice only when all other options for terminally ill patients have been exhausted. See Alison C. Hall, Note, To Die with Dignity:
Comparing Physician-Assisted Suicide in the United States,japan, and the Netherlands, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 803, 825 (1996).
In 1995, Australia's Northern Territory passed the Northern Territory Rights
of the Terminally III Act. The Act allows physicians to prescribe and administer
lethal substances to terminally ill patients who formally request assistance in ending their lives. See Christopher James Ryan & Miranda Kaye, Euthanasia in Australia - The Northern Territory Rights of the Terminally III Act, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 326,
326 (1996). In all other Australian states, voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide remain illegal, "although some have recently enacted laws recognizing a right
to have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn and protecting members of medical
staffs against liability if they stop treatment at a patient's request." Id.
The Supreme Court of Canada recently struggled with the constitutionality
of a statute criminalizing assisted suicide. A competent patient suffering from
Lou Gehrig's disease asked for a judicial declaration that the statute was void as
applied to her and her physician. The Court dismissed her petition, concluding
that human life must be respected and that no societal consensus existed in favor
of legalizing physician-assisted suicide. See MEISEL, supra note 137, § 18.22, at 50506.
224. See Glantz, supra note 24, at 235.
225. See id. ("[P]roving beyond a reasonable doubt [that terminally ill elderly patients] died as victims of homicide, rather than from mftural causes, will
often be difficult.").
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The Criminal Law and Extreme Medical Negligence

The involvement of the criminal law in cases where some extreme form of professional negligence has caused death also ap226
pears to be highly unusua1.
Doctors rarely have been charged
criminally with conduct that must be evaluated by scrutinizing the
227
standard of care used in treating patients.
Only one decision to
withdraw treatinent from a terminally ill patient, the Barber case,228
has resulted in the criminal prosecution of the treating physicians. 229 That prosecution ended, however, when the California
Court of Appeals granted a writ of prohibition. 230
More often, a prosecutor's decision to pursue a conviction has
been based on conduct that does not involve evaluating the stan231
dard of care. Typically, the alleged wrongful actions fall into one
of two categories: 1) conduct that would be criminal whether done
by a doctor or anyone else - for example, sexually molesting patients,232 committing Medicaid fraud,233 or prescribing drugs for
non therapeutic purposes;234 or 2) conduct that is so aggravated that
expert testimony is scarcely needed to demonstrate the conduct's

226. See id. at 231 (discussing judicial reluctance to interfere with physicians'
practice of medicine).
227. See id. at 236.
228. See supra notes 160-71 and accompanying text.
229. See Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 486 (Ct. App. 1983).
In this case, two California physicians were charged with murder after assenting to
the requests of a patient's family to withdraw all life support systems. See id.; see
also Glantz, supra note 24, at 236.
230. See Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
231. See Glantz, supra note 24, at 231.
232. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Helfant, 496 N.E.2d 433, 436 (Mass. 1986)
(finding a physician guilty of rape after he drugged a patient in order to have
sexual intercourse with her); Minnesota v. Poole, 489 N.W.2d 537,545 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992) (stating that a physician is guilty of criminal sexual conduct if the "actor accomplishes the sexual [contact] by means of a false representation that the
contact is for a bona fide medical purpose by a health care professional").
233. See, e.g., United States v. Khan, 53 F.3d 507,513-15 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding several physicians and the clinic organizer guilty of participating in a racketeering enterprise designed to defraud the New York State Medicaid system);
United States v. Laughlin, 26 F.3d 1523, 1526-27 (lOth Cir. 1994) (finding a physician guilty of Medicaid fraud).
234. See, e.g., Williamson v. Board of Med. Quality Assurance, 266 Cal. Rptr.
520, 522 (Ct. App. 1990) (revoking a physician's medical license after the physician had illegally prescribed drugs); Connecticut v. Levine, 551 A.2d 1271, 127677 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (finding a physician guilty of illegally prescribing narcotics and controlled substances); Ohio v. McGriff, 672 N.E.2d 1074, 1075 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1996) (finding a physician guilty of illegally prescribing stimulants).
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gross departure from accepted medical practice. 235
An example of the second type of conduct involved a prosecu236
tion for involuntary manslaughter in Pennsylvania. Ajury found
a doctor criminally liable for the death of a seventeen-year-old patient who died of complications related to an overdose of the barbiturate Tuinal. 237 The doctor had written numerous prescriptions
for controlled substances for the patient in the months preceding
238
her death. In the seven weeks before her death, he had given the
patient seven separate prescriptions for Tuinal, in double the normal strength. 239 On one occasion, about a month before her death,
the patient had arrived at a pharmacy in such a stuporous condition that she had to hold on to the cash register to maintain her
balance. 2 When the pharmacist called the physician to express his
reluctance to refill the prescription, the doctor told him to "fill the
damn thing.,,241 The evidence detailed by the court's opinion so
overwhelmingly demonstrated the defendant physician's gross irre242
sponsibility in prescribing the medication that one could conclude that expert testimony was unnecessary to support the jury's
finding that the doctor "consciously disregarded a substantial and
unjustifiable risk ... [involving] a gross deviation from the standard of conduct a reasonable person would have observed.,,243
In another case involving conduct that grossly departed from
accepted medical standards, Dr. Tony Protopappas, a California
dentist, was convicted of second-degree murder for the deaths of
244
three of his patients following anesthesia overdose.
Dr. Protopappas caused the deaths of three young women within five
months,245 two of them within four days of each other, by his staggering disregard for the most basic principles of competent ad4{)

235. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Youngkin, 427 A.2d 1356, 1361 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1981) (involving a physician who "recklessly overprescribed [medication] to [a
patient] over the course of several months").
236. See id.
237. See id. at 1359.
238. See id. at 1360-61.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 1361.
241. Youngkin, 427 A.2d at 1361.
242. See id. The court found relevant the facts that the patient was an outpatient and Tuinal is rarely prescribed to outpatients, the strength of the prescription, and the frequency of the prescription. See id.
243. Id.
244. See People v. Protopappas, 246 Cal. Rptr. 915, 916 (Ct. App. 1988).
245. See id. at 926-27.
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246

mInIstration of general anesthesia.
The court summarized the
47
doctor's outrageous conduce and then stated:
No reasonable person, much less a dentist trained in the
use of anesthesia, could have failed to appreciate the
grave risk of death posed by the procedures he utilized. It
was not a question of whether a fatality would occur, only a
question of when; and ultimately there were three of
th em. 248
The conduct in each of the aforementioned cases clearly supported
the jury's verdict. These actions are inapposite, however, to a physician's attempt to alleviate pain by prescribing high doses of morphine to terminally ill patients.
In another case involving extreme medical negligence, the
physician was convicted of willfully violating New York's public
health laws. 249 In 1990, Dr. Gerald Einaugler transferred his seventy-eight-year-old patient from a hospital to a nursing home across
250
the street. There, Dr. Einaugler mistook the patient's peritonealdialysis catheter for a gastrostomy tube and directed the staff to
251
feed her through it. When the mistake was discovered by a nurse,
Dr. Einaugler was advised to "get the patient to a hospital. ,,252 He
delayed the transfer for more than ten hours, despite his knowledge that peritonitis would likely develop and could become fatal if
253
untreated.
Peritonitis did develop, and the patient died within
days. 254 Dr. Einaugler was convicted of recklessly endangering his

246. See id. at 927.
247. See id. at 927-28. The court obselVed:
Protopappas did not supply proper general anesthesia or tailor the dosage to the patient. Without the patient's authorization he substituted
surrogate dentists who were neither licensed nor qualified to administer
general anesthesia. He instructed them to give improperly preset dosages for extended periods with little or no personal supeIVision and
caused multiple patients to receive ever increasing amounts of general
anesthesia at the same time, none of them enjoying his undivided attention. He was also habitually slow in reacting to the resulting overdoses;
and in the case of Craven, simply abandoned her.
Id. at 927.
248. Id. at 928.
249. See George J. Annas, Medicine, Death and the Criminal Law, 333 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 527, 528 (1995) (discussing the case of Dr. Gerald Einaugler).
250. See People v. Einaugler, 618 N.Y.S.2d 414,415 (App. Div. 1994).
251. See id.
252. Id.
253. See id.
254. See id.
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255

patient and of willfully violating New York's health laws.
On appeal, the court found that his conduct fully supported the conviction for reckless endangerment and was a "willful act of neglect," in
256
violation of New York's public health laws.
It found that the doctor displayed a conscious disregard for the patient's safety by failing
257
to transfer her to a hospital for treatment.
It was not Dr.
Einaugler's misidentification of his patient's dialysis tube that ran
afoul of the criminal law but, rather, his attempt to conceal that er258
ror by delaying her transfer to a hospital.
He was never charged
259
criminally with the patient's death, however.
In several recent cases, the criminal law again has been used to
sanction physicians for the deaths of patients where the physician's
260
conduct has been deemed particularly outrageous.
In another
New York case, Dr. David Benjamin was convicted of murder for
knowingly and intentionally causing the death of a patient after
261
performing a late-term abortion.
The court found that Dr. Benjamin knew he did not have the required skills, yet he performed
the abortion in deliberate indifference to the health and safety of
262
his patient, who died from excessive bleeding. At the time of the
death, the state licensing authority had revoked the doctor's medical license temporarily for exhibiting gross incompetence and neg263
ligence while treating five other patients.
The state, however,
permitted Dr. Benjamin to continue to practice pending final
revocation of his license. 264
In 1995, in Colorado, prosecutors charged Dr. Joseph J. Verbrugge, Jr., an anesthesiologist, with manslaughter after he fell
asleep during ear surgery on an eight-year-old boy. 265 When the pa255. See id. at 414-15.
256. Einaugler, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 415-16.
257. See id. at 415.
258. See id. at 415-16. "[T]his case does not support the proposition that
medical professionals need fear the prospect of unwarranted criminal prosecutions for honest errors of medical judgment." [d. at 416.
259. See Annas, supra note 249, at 528 (hypothesizing that one reason for the
district attorney's failure to prosecute was that he may not have believed that he
could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the patient would have survived had
she been transferred sooner).
260. For a fuller discussion of these cases, see id. at 527.
261. See Lynette Holloway, Abortion Doctor Guilty of Murder, N.V. TIMES, Aug.
9,1995, at AI.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See Howard Pankratz, Manslaughter Charge Filed in Fatal Ear Surgery,
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tient died, the Colorado Board of Medical Examiners found that
the doctor's "actions fell 'grossly below accepted standards of
medical practice' and 'likely resulted' in the boy's death.,,266 Besides failing to monitor the boy during surgery and remaining
awake, vigilant, and responsive to the developing crisis, Dr. Ver267
brugge also falsified the boy's medical chart.
In April of 1995,
when he was charged with manslaughter in connection with the
boy's death, it was alleged that Dr. Verbrugge had fallen asleep
268
during at least six other operations in the recent past.
In perhaps the most egregious case, Dr. Milos Klvana, a California obstetrician, was convicted of nine counts of second-degree
murder for nine deaths that took place over an eleven-year pe269
riod. The court found that he acted deliberately and with a con270
scious disregard for life. The opinion in this astonishing case revealed the outrageousness of Dr. Klvana's conduct. 271
He
repeatedly engaged in grossly incompetent and unsafe obstetrical
practices, lost privileges at several hospitals, lied to patients and to
the hospitals at which he sought privileges, disregarded numerous
warnings from other doctors about his practice methods and his
attitude, and asked his patients to suppress facts about their deliver272
ies and to lie to authorities.
These isolated and highly unusual cases involve conduct which
can properly be called - at the very least - willful and wanton. In
273
some, it was sufficiently aggravated to be found intentional.
In a
number of them, it seems the failure of the medical boards to intervene decisively was an important factor in the involvement of the
274
criminal law.
Certainly, the physicians' acts far exceeded anything that could be regarded as the exercise of good-faith medical

DENVER POST,

Apr. 6, 1995, at B1.
266. Id.
267. See id.
268. See Annas, supra note 249, at 528.
269. See People v. Klvana, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 512, 514-15 (Ct. App. 1992).
270. See id. at 526.
271. See id. at 527.
272. Id.
273. See Annas, supra note 249, at 529 (stating that criminal charges against
physicians almost always involve extreme conduct that recklessly or intentionally
deviates from the accepted standard of care).
274. See id. ("In the rare cases of criminal prosecution, charges have usually
been brought because a pattern of deaths and reckless disregard for patients'
safety has emerged and, for some reason, the physician's license has not been revoked.").
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JU

C. Physicians' Good-Faith Treatment of Patients
When physicians engage in good-faith efforts to treat patients,
courts are extremely reluctant to try to regulate their conduct by
276
means of the criminal law.
Courts have recognized that manslaughter and murder statutes are inappropriate and ineffective as
277
means of such control.
In Commonwealth v. Edelin, a 1976 Massachusetts case, a physician was tried for manslaughter after performing an abortion of an allegedly viable fetus. 278 The court reversed a
jury conviction, pointing out that even if the doctor's judgment of
nonviability had been wrong, "manslaughter could not be supported by proof merely of a mistake of judgment, even if that was
the result of negligence or gross negligence.,,279 So long as the physician's judgment is made in good faith and is not "grievously unrea28o
sonable by medical standards," the law will not interfere.
As the
majority opinion in Edelin stated: "A larger teaching of this case
may be that, whereas a physician is accountable to the criminal law
even when performing professional tasks, any assessment of his responsibility should pay due regard to the unavoidable difficulties
and dubieties of many professional judgments. ,,281
The President's Commission, in its 1983 report entitled Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, cogently articulated the reasons for deferring to medical judgment, and the importance of it,
especially in the administration of pain medication to the dying pa275. See id. (concluding that physicians' good-faith errors and inadvertent
mistakes in the treatment of patients will not result in criminal liability) .
276. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 486 (Ct. App.
1983) ("[I]t appears to us that a murder prosecution is a poor way to design an
ethical and moral code for doctors who are faced with decisions concerning the
use of costly and extraordinary 'life support' equipment."). The Florida Supreme
Court best summarized this reasoning when it stated:
To be relieved of potential civil and criminal liability, guardians, consenting family members, physicians, hospitals, or their administrators
need only act in good faith. For them to be held civilly or criminally liable, there must be a showing that their actions were not in good faith
but were intended to harm the patient.
John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984).
277. See, e.g., Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486; Commonwealth v. Edelin, 359
N.E.2d 4,12 (Mass. 1976).
278. Edelin, 359 N.E.2d at 5.
279. [d. at 13.
280. [d. (emphasis added).
28l. [d. at 18.
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tient. The report stated:
[AJlthough medication is commonly used to relieve the
suffering of dying patients (even when it causes or risks
causing death), physicians are not held to have violated
the law.
How can this failure to prosecute be explained ... ?
The explanation lies in the importance of defining
physicians' responsibilities regarding these choices and of
developing an accepted and well-regulated social role that
allows the choices to be made with due care. The search
for medical treatments that will benefit a patient often involves risk, sometimes great risk, for the patient: for example, some surgery still carries a sizable risk of mortality,
as does much of cancer therapy. Furthermore, seeking to
cure disease and to prolong life is only a part of the physician's traditional role in caring for patients; another important part is to comfort patients and relieve their suffering. Sometimes these goals conflict, and a physician and
patient (or patient's surrogate) have the authority to decide which goal has priority.282
For these reasons, the courts properly hesitate before interfering
with a physician's medical judgment, except in egregious cases.
D.

The Appropriate Role oj the Criminal Law in Medical Decisions

Criminal prosecutions of physicians engaged in treating terminally ill patients and making good-faith decisions about medication to control pain and suffering should rarely, if ever, be
brought. Patients in these extreme circumstances require and are
entitled to the fearless, aggressive efforts of their doctors to control
their final pain and suffering. The intensity of these measures of283
ten can and should rival earlier efforts to keep the patient alive.
To allow a patient to experience unbearable pain or suffering is an
unethical medical practice, and physicians should not allow exaggerated fears of legal action to deter them from providing dying
patients with aggressive, intensive palliative care. Morphine and a
few other drugs in the medical arsenal are the heaviest of artillery,
282. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 180, at 78-79.
283. See Wanzer, A Second Look, supra note 22, at 847. Dr. Wanzer and his
colleagues remarked that" [t] 0 withhold any necessary measure of pain relief in a
hopelessly ill person out of fear of depressing respiration or of possible legal repercussions is unjustifiable. Good medical practice is the best protection against
legal liability. " Id.
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284
used for the most urgent of reasons.
Some risk will always be at285
tendant to their use. The dosage requirements for adequate pain
relief and the susceptibility of individuals to dangerous side effects
are highly variable factors which may make every administration of
286
morphine hazardous.
Nevertheless, morphine appropriately remains the drug most often prescribed for the effective treatment of
terminal pain and suffering,287 whether it be the pain of metastatic
cancer,288 or the frightening, gasping suffocation that often follows
withdrawal of a ventilator. 289 Morphine can keep most patients vir290
tually pain-free, anxiety-free, and often alert for long periods.
How best, how much, and when to administer morphine are peculiarly medical decisions, with which the criminal law should not interfere, except in the most extraordinary of cases.
In addition, it is important to contemplate the ramifications
for other dying patients if physicians are made fearful of criminal
liability when they seek to manage terminal pain and suffering aggressively. For many people, the fear of pain and extreme anxiety
regarding the ability of the medical profession to deal with it
291
greatly exceed the fear of dying. Medicine knows how to control
pain in most cases.292 Yet, when doctors become fearful of using
the tools at their disposal, they become incapable of doing what
they are able to do. Patients consequently suffer needlessly.
Criminal prosecutions in cases like the Minnesota morphine investigations, even if unsuccessful, have the potential to cause enormous damage, in exchange for little social value. The Minnesota
cases were not about euthanasia, and they were not about culpable
negligence. Such cases rarely are. The intervention of the criminallaw is not likely to deter or remedy either problem.
During the investigation of the two Minnesota cases, it became
apparent that there was inadequate documentation substantiating

284. See Foley, Treatment of Cancer Pain, supra note 54, at 88.
285. See id. at 88-89 (noting that the potential side effects and complications
include addiction, excessive sedation, respiratory depression, nausea and vomiting, constipation, overdose, and seizures).
286. See id.
287. See id. at 89.
288. See Melzack, supra note 41, at 28.
289. See Feldman, supra note 108, at 20.
290. See Melzack, supra note 41, at 28-29.
291. See id. at 27 (stating that pain can be worse than death itself and can
erode the patient's will to live).
292. See Buchan & Tolle, supra note 22, at 59.
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293
the need for morphine at the levels given in both cases.
It was
also clear that most health care institutions had no procedures or
guidelines to assist physicians in the appropriate use of large dosages of pain-relieving medication.294 In an effort to give some clarity to the issue and guidance to physicians, the Hennepin County
Medical Society prepared a paper entitled "Position Paper on Management of Pain and Suffering in the Dying Patient.,,295 A wide
consensus of the Minnesota medical community supported the pa296
per.
Subsequently, the Hennepin County Attorney and the Hennepin County Medical Examiner jointly issued a statement calling on
medical institutions to formulate guidelines for the administration
of pain-relieving drugs.297 The statement strongly advised health
care centers to examine and revise their own policies to reflect the
concerns the morphine cases raised (particularly concerns about
documentation), and to give better, more specific guidance to doctors who must decide how to best dispense high dosages of narcot298
ics to dying patients.
Although the medical community initially did not react favorably to that joint report,299 considerable constructive dialogue
followed between representatives of the Minnesota Medical Association and the Hennepin County Attorney and Medical Exam30o
iner.
A number of hospitals began to take steps to adopt procedures to help ensure the delivery of well-documented, effective,
30l
and compassionate palliative care for hopelessly ill patients.
In
293. See Feldman, supra note 108, at 23-24 (stating that "[i]nadequate
documentation appears to be at the heart of the matter in the two Hennepin
County cases" and arguing that better documentation is needed in all medical records).
294. See id. at 24.
295. See J. Paul Carlson, Managing Pain and Suffering in the Dying Patient,
MINN. MED.,June 1990, at 35,35. This paper has been reproduced in Appendix
A of this Article.
296. See id. (stating that the paper represents the "position of organized
medicine on this subject").
297. See Feldman, supra note 108, at 20, 23-24.
298. See id. at 23-24.
299. See id. at 24 (noting that the medical community objected to the report's recommendation that hospitals formulate guidelines "as an unwarranted
intrusion into medical matters").
300. See id. at 20.
301. SeeJohnson, supra note 24, at 29. Several hospitals instituted guidelines
similar to those proposed by the county attorney and the medical examiner. According to Johnson, physicians at these facilities are less likely to be the subject of
a criminal investigation and prosecution. See id. Johnson posits:
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time, horror stories of end-stage cancer patients dying in excruciating pain have become less common.
Other encouraging developments have occurred since the
morphine investigations. In 1992, Minnesota amended its assisted
suicide statute by adding a subdivision that describes acts or omiss02
sions not considered aiding suicide. It states:
A health care provider ... who administers, prescribes, or
dispenses medications or procedures to relieve another
person's pain or discomfort, even if the medication or
procedure may hasten or increase the risk of death, does
not violate this section unless the medications or procedures are knowingly administered, prescribed, or dispensed to cause death.30s
Other states have passed similar provisions, in an effort to assure
doctors that criminal charges will not result from their appropriate
and compassionate palliative care for dying patients. S04
As noted earlier, hospice care is on the rise in the United
. b urses proVl'd ers Lor
c
thoIS type 0 f care. S06
States. S05 Me d'lcare now relm
In 1996, the Health Care Financing Administration approved a
new diagnosis code for palliative care, which should lead to the
creation of a special diagnosis-related group to allow payment of
palliative care expenses for hospitalized patients as they approach
death.s07 In addition to the guidelines for the treatment of cancer
pain to which this Article previously referred,sos at least forty-seven
states have started cancer pain initiatives to increase awareness and
knowledge about effective palliative care strategies. S09
Still, uncontrolled pain remains an important motivation be-

Compliance with the guidelines will be overwhelming evidence that the
physician not only acted in good faith, but also that the administration of
the pain-relieving drug was done in a manner consistent with prevailing
medical standards. In such circumstances, there can be no criminal liability.

Id.
302. See MINN. STAT. § 609.215, subd. 3(a) (1996).
303. Id.
304. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-lO4 (Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. §
35-42-1-2.5 (Michie Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216 (Supp. 1996);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1116 (1993).
305. See Cassel & Vladeck, supra note 39, at 1233.
306. See id. at 1232.
307. See id. at 1232 (noting that "only in 1996 are we beginning to acknowledge that some of the care delivered in hospitals is palliative").
308. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
309. See Foley, Pain Relief, supra note 72, at 2149.
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s10

hind many patients' desire for suicide.
In one survey, sixty-nine
percent of cancer patients reported that they would consider
committing suicide if their pain were not treated adequately.Sll
More than half of all cancer patients experience severe pain,mand
two-thirds of those with advanced disease report pain.SIS Yet studies
indicate that as many as ninety-five percent of these patients can
get good pain relief if skilled practitioners administer the right
314
quantities of the right medications.

v.

CONCLUSION

The prospect of legal access to physician-assisted suicide raises
deep and disturbing questions about our commitment to the compassionate care of the dying. Many articulate and persuasive challenges have been raised against physician-assisted suicide, by individuals and groups on all fronts, conservatives and liberals,
believers and agnostics, physicians and philosophers. m

310. See Kathleen M. Foley, Pain, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 4
, PAIN F. 163, 175 (1995) [hereinafter Foley, Physician-Assisted Suicide].
311. See Foley, Misconceptions and Controversies, supra note 63, at 311.
312. See John J. Bonica, Cancer Pain, in 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF PAIN 400, 402
(2d ed. 1990); see also Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association,
Good Care of the Dying Patient, 275 JAMA 474 (1996) (reviewing AMA reports on
the care of dying patients).
313. See The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve
Care for Seriously III Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferencesfor Outcomes and Risks of Treatments, 274JAMA 1591,1594 (1995). The study
revealed that families of 50% of a sample of patients who died in the hospital believed that the patients "experienced moderate or severe pain at least half the
time during their last [three] days of life." Id.; see also Foley, Treatment of Cancer
Pain, supra note 54, at 84 (asserting that pain control should be sufficient to allow
the patients with advanced disease to function at a level that they choose and to
die relatively free of pain).
314. See Foley, Controlling Pain, supra note 58, at 164; Cicely Saunders, Current Views on Pain Relief and Terminal Care, in THE THERAPY OF PAIN 215, 218 (Mark
Swerdlow ed., 1981).
315. See Paul Wilkes, The Next Pro-Lifers, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,1996, § 6 (Magazine), at 22 (listing "agnostics and believers; those who support legalized abortion
and those who oppose it, those who bow to God and those who exalt reason; AIDS
activists and Orthodox rabbis, the American Medical Association and Pope John
Paul 11"). See generally Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide - Even a Very Limited
Form, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 735 (1995) (arguing adamantly against assisted
suicide); DANIEL CALlAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE (1993) (proposing plausible ways of bringing the legal and policy issues in the care of the dying and the
critically ill back into closer contact with some of the oldest questions of human
existence) .
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316
Not only have the two decisions from the Second and the
Ninth317 Circuits provoked widespread discussion and commentary,
they have evoked anew the concerns that physicians and others
have expressed for years: that there is no principled way to limit assisted suicide to terminally ill, mentally competent patients who
make rational requests for such aid; that assisted suicide will lead to
euthanasia, and that both will be "practiced through the prism of
social inequality and prejudice that characterizes the delivery of
[health care] in all segments of society,,;318 that although there may
be morally acceptable exceptional cases for assisted suicide, such
cases cannot justifY such a dramatic change in public policy, with its
enormous potential for abuse; that the relationship of doctors to
their dying patients, already emotionally taxing and complicated,
will be disastrously changed, with trust eroded;319 that elderly, poor,
and disadvantaged patients will be subject to pressures they cannot
withstand; that the many terminally ill patients who suffer from
treatable depression will remain untreated, and "physician-assisted
suicide [will] take the place of psychiatric intervention and care,,;320
and finally, that we will no longer vigorously pursue means to make
dying more comfortable, more peaceful, and more meaningful for
the vast majority of dying patients who do not want suicide.
Perhaps we need to be reminded again of the relationship our
physicians traditionally have had with us and of the ancient Hippocratic command known to all doctors, that" [t] 0 please no one will
I prescribe a deadly drug, nor give advice which may cause his
d ea th ."321
How then, ... do I respond to patients' requests for physician-assisted suicide? In the only way I can, by saying
that I value their lives and their worth and therefore cannot kill them. I tell them, too, that I will care for them
and treat their symptoms, and, if their pain cannot be
adequately controlled while they are dying, that I will
honor their choice to be sedated. And, last, I assure them

316. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.) , cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36
(1996).
317. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
318. Kamisar, supra note 315, at 738.
319. See Steven H. Miles, M.D., Physicians and Their Patients' Suicides, 271
JAMA 1786,1786-87 (1994).
320. Foley, Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note 310, at 165.
321. OXFORD MEDICAL COMPANION 371 Uohn Walton et al. eds., 1994).
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that I will never abandon them but will remain to the end
a witness to their dying.322

APPENDICES

Mter the Minnesota morphine investigations, the Hennepin
County Medical Society issued a position paper and the Hennepin
County Attorney and Medical Examiner jointly issued guidelines
on the management of pain in terminally ill patients. Both are reproduced below.
APPENDIX A
HENNEPIN COUNIY MEDICAL SOCIE'IY POSITION PAPER ON
323
MANAGEMENT OF PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THE DYING PATIENT

Statement of Need
Fear, misunderstanding, and misplaced concern can contribute to the pain and suffering of the dying patient. The patient's
fear of pain may accentuate the pain or the suffering of both patient and family. Misunderstanding by health care professionals of
ethical and legal principles can contribute to the problem. Physicians and nurses may be concerned that administering large
amounts of morphine, or other narcotics, to the dying patient may
be viewed by others as euthanasia, an intentional act to cause death
for reasons of compassion, rather than as an effort to control pain
and suffering. This concern is misplaced. The administration of
large quantities of narcotic analgesics is not euthanasia when the
purpose is to alleviate pain and suffering, not to shorten the life of
the patient. There are sufficient ethical, moral and medical reasons to prescribe morphine, and other pain relieving medications,
even at the risk of hastening the patient's death.
Physicians, and other health care providers, have an obligation
to provide maximal relief from pain and suffering for dying pa-

322. Kathleen M. Foley, Pain and America's Culture of Death, WILSON Q.,
Autumn 1994, at 20, 2l.
323. Hennepin County Medical Society, Position Paper on Management of
Pain and Suffering in the Dying Patient, in J. Paul Carlson, Managing Pain and Suf
fering in the Dying Patient, MINN. MED.,June 1990, at 35,36-37.
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tients. To fulfill this obligation, health care providers must understand applicable ethical and legal principles, as well as current
practices in pain management. They must also be attentive to the
individual patient's response to narcotic and sedative drugs.
Scope of Statement

This statement applies only to the use of narcotics, and other
analgesia, in the management of pain and suffering in dying patients, based on accepted medical, ethical, and legal principles and
practices. Other institutional policies and guidelines address pain
control for non-terminal patients, as well as termination of lifesustaining treatment for dying persons, and specific treatment modalities such as cardiopulmonary resu!?citation, sustained assisted
ventilation, etc. Other policies and guidelines address the decision-making process, including the role of advance directives. Physicians, and other health care professionals, should be knowledgeable about all policies and guidelines that apply to the care of
persons with terminal conditions.
A dying patient is an individual with an incurable and irreversible condition that usually leads to death, unless life-sustaining
treatment is instituted or continued.
Principles for the Management of Pain and Suffering for Dying Patients

Dying patients who possess the capacity for decision-making,
or the appropriate surrogates of patients who do not have the capacity to make decisions, have the right to participate in decisions
about the course of their own medical treatment, including the degree of pain relief desired. Health care professionals should make
every effort to relieve the suffering of the dying patient, even if this
requires intermittent or continued administration of significantly
larger doses of narcotics and sedation, which in circumstances
other than anticipated death would be considered inappropriate.
The goal of treatment is to relieve patient suffering to the fullest extent possible. For dying patients there is no "cap" dose; high doses may be
required for relief of pain and suffering.
The role of the physician in caring for the dying patient is to
provide comfort and maintain dignity. Dying patients should be
assured that maximal comfort will be provided even in the face of
impending death, and even when the physical effects of narcotics,
or other analgesics, such as falling blood pressure, declining rate of
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respirations, or altered level of consciousness, are present. On the
other hand, it is unacceptable for health care providers to administer such drugs for the purpose of abetting the patient's suicide, or
to deliberately cause the patient's death for reasons of compassion.
In managing dying patients, health care professionals are not obligated to do that which violates their conscience or professional
judgment, but have the duty to arrange for alternative care under
such circumstances.
The principles stated herein reflect those stated in 1) The Hastings
Center Report, Guidelines on the Termination of Life Sustaining
Treatment and The Care of the Dying, 2) The University of California
Los Angeles Medical Center Policy, Administration of Narcotics for Dying Patients, and 3) The Report of the President's Commission, Deciding
to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment. The President's Commission report references the ''principle of double effect, " as stated in the Declaration
of Euthanasia, Vatican City, 1980.

APPENDIxB
JOINT GUIDELINES OF THE HENNEPIN COUNTY ATTORNEY AND
HENNEPIN COUNTY MEDICAL EXAMINER FOR THE ADMINISTRATION
324
OF PAIN-RELIEVING DRUGS

1.

Governing Principles

A. The administration of large dosages of pain-relieving
drugs to terminally ill patients is appropriate only as necessary for
the relief of pain, discomfort or distress.
B. Proper decision-making and proper administration include thorough documentation particularly of the need for the
drug at the dosage level administered.
C. Hospitals and other institutions should develop and adopt
specific guidelines establishing the acceptable standard of medical
practice for the treatment of terminally ill patients with large dosages of pain-relieving drugs.
D. Hospitals and other institutions caring for terminally ill pa324. Garry Peterson, M.D., Hennepin County Medical Examiner & Thomas
L. Johnson, Hennepin County Attorney, Joint Guidelines of the Hennepin
County Attorney and Hennepin County Medical Examiner for the Administration
of Pain-Relieving Drugs (April 24, 1990) (on file with the Hennepin County Attorney, Criminal Division).
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tients should develop and adopt procedures to ensure doctors and
other professionals under their authority follow their guidelines.
E. Creation of and adherence to such guidelines should assure patients of compassionate and effective treatment and should
create community confidence in the actions of hospitals and health
care professionals involved in the care of terminally ill patients.

II.

Policies and Procedures

A. The specific policies and procedures adopted may vary
from institution to institution. However, such guidelines should
address at a minimum:
1. Patient selection criteria;

2. Obtainment of consent and notification of patients
and/ or their families or legal representatives;
3. Documentation of treatment decisions made, their
underlying rationales and goals, the patient's symptoms
and indications for such treatment decisions and the patient's responses to such treatment;
4. Administration procedures to be followed, including the content of the Physician's Order authorizing the
drug;
5. Responsibilities of and coordination of responsibilities among physicians, nurses, and other health care
professionals;
6. A review process for the treatment given pursuant to
the guidelines. (By way of analogy, blood transfusion review and surgically removed tissue review are universally
familiar facets of hospital quality assurance.)
B. An example of existing guidelines that may serve as a basis
for appropriate policies and procedures is the UCLA Medical Center Policy No. 0024 dealing with the "Administration of Narcotics
for the Dying Patient" (copy attached), a pioneering effort in creating a systematic and medically sound treatment approach to the dying patient.

III. Effect of Guidelines
The development of specific guidelines consistent with the
above and adherence to such guidelines should obviate the need
for involvement by the Hennepin County Medical Examiner and
Hennepin County Attorney. In the event involvement is necessary,
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the existence of such guidelines and adherence to them will be an
important consideration in the review process.
UCLA MEDICAL CENTER POLICY No. 0024.

Subject:
Administration of Narcotics for the Dying Patient.
Purpose:
To relieve maximally the pain and suffering of dying patients.
Reference:
Nursing Service Policy # 048, Medication Administration.
Principles:
1. Dying patients (or an appropriate surrogate) who possess
decision-making capacity have the right to participate in decisions
about the course of their own medical treatment, including the degree of pain relief desired in the final stage oflife.
2. Health care professionals must make every effort to relieve the pain and suffering of the dying patient even if this requires either intermittent or continued administration of significantly larger doses of narcotics which in circumstances other than
anticipated death would be considered inappropriate. The goal of
treatment is to relieve pain and suffering to the fullest extent possible.
3. Dying patients should be assured the maximal possible
comfort even in the face of impending death as heralded by falling
blood pressure, declining rate of respirations, or altered level of
conSCIOusness.
4. Health care professionals are not obliged to do that which
violates their conscience or professional judgment, but have the
duty to arrange for alternative care under such circumstances.
Implementation:
1. Establish that patient fits the selection criteria.
2. Establish guidelines for ordering and administering the
narcotic, and for documentation.
Patient Selection Criteria
A. Patient must have current Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) order.
B. Patient must be dying and experiencing symptoms causing pain, discomfort, or distress for which narcotics are an accepted treatment.
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Protocol for Ordering, Administering and Documenting
A. Physician Responsibility
1.
The rationale and goals of narcotic therapy for the dying
patient must be documented in the Progress Notes of the patient's
medical record. A statement that the patient (or appropriate surrogate) agrees with this therapy must be included as well. This
note must be written by the attending physician, or by the house
officer with the verbal concurrence of the attending or chief resident. The attending must concur with this note within 24 hours by
signing the house officer's Progress Note.
2.
The Physician's Order must begin with the statement:
''Administration of Narcotic for the Dying Patient." This order must be
written by the attending physician, or by the house officer with the
verbal concurrence of the attending or chief resident. The attending must concur with this note within 24 hours by signing the
house officer's Physician's Order.
3. The Physician's Order must specify:
a. The amount of drug: the amount of diluent.

b.

The time interval and amount of drug in mgs/hour
for incremental dose increase.
c. That incremental dose increases are to be based on
pain or symptom assessment and not vital sign parameters.
d. A maximum or "cap" dose is not required.
e. The conditions under which he/she wishes to be notified.
4. The narcotic order must be renewed every 72 hours.
5. Telephone and/or verbal orders are not acceptable when
initiating or changing the order.
6. The physician should assess the efficacy of narcotic treatment on a frequent basis.
B.

RN. Responsibility
1. Only staff R.N.'s who have passed the V.C.L.A. Pharmacology exam may administer narcotics.
2. If IV/SQ continuous infusion narcotics are ordered, they
must always be administered via an infusion pump. The IV tubing
proximal to the infusion device must be clearly identified signifying
that this line is infusing a narcotic.
3. Administrative Nurse (A.N.) II, III, IV, or V, or a unit
based Clinical Nurse Specialist must co-sign the order.
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4. The pharmacy is to be notified at least 30 minutes before
the next bag of narcotic infusion is needed to allow for drug
preparation.
5. The R.N. administering the narcotic will:
a. Increase the medication by the amount specified in
mgs/hour within the given time increments should
the patient continue to experience pain or other distressing symptoms.
b. Assess the efficacy of treatment on a frequent basis
and inform the physician when pain or other distressing symptoms are not relieved.
c. Alert the physician when the maximum dose of the
narcotic has been given.
d. Not discontinue the narcotic in the event the narcotic
order is not renewed in 72 hours according to policy,
but rather will notify the physician immediately so
that a renewal order may be written at once.
e. Discontinue the narcotic only upon the physician's
order.
f.
Document the initiation or titration of the IV infusion on the Continuous Narcotic Administration Record, on the Nurses Notes, and on the Controlled
Substance Audit Sheet.
6. Two nurses must co-sign any wastage of unused narcotic
solution in the Controlled Substance Administration Record per
Nursing Service Policy #050. Any narcotic being returned to
Pharmacy must also be documented on this Record.
7. Vital signs may be obtained to assess the patient's status in
the dying process, but should not influence decisions about administering narcotics in the presence of continued pain or other distressing symptoms for which the narcotic is an accepted treatment.
8. The following narcotics administered by continuous infusion may include but are not limited to:
a. Morphine Sulfate
b. Hydromorphone (Dilaudid)
c. Methadone
d. Fentanyl
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